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THE END OF ENTRY FICTION *
EUNICE LEE **
Although “entry fiction” emerged in immigration and constitutional law over a
century ago, the doctrine has yet to account for present-day carceral and
technological realities. Under entry fiction, “arriving” immigrants stopped at the
border are deemed “unentered” and “not here” for constitutional due process
purposes, even in detention centers deep within the United States. As a result,
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) uses its sole discretion to detain
tens of thousands of arriving asylum seekers in its facilities without a bond
hearing. Despite significant modern changes in immigration statutes and due
process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court recently suggested, but did not decide,
that individuals subject to entry fiction may continue to lack constitutional due
process protections against detention. Both courts and the government have
invoked sovereign power as the doctrine’s justification, asserting that detention
is necessary to effect exclusion (removal) of individuals and that entry fiction
appropriately protects the government’s power to detain.
While many scholars over the decades have offered trenchant critiques of the
doctrine, no recent treatment evaluates entry fiction as legal fiction. This Article
fills that gap, tracing entry fiction’s origins in law and jurisprudence to consider
its operation in the present-day context. I engage in a close rereading of Chinese
Exclusion- and McCarthy-era cases to uncover functionalist and humanitarian
underpinnings of entry fiction, including an intention to minimize hardship to
immigrants. I then reevaluate entry fiction in the present day. In particular, this
Article explores DHS’s indiscriminate use of immigration detention and its
breathtaking expansion of surveillance technology. Today, DHS both operates a
mass detention regime and engages in ever-increasing surveillance, including
real-time tracking of immigrants that allows deportation without physical
detention. These current realities decouple entry fiction from sovereign purpose—
rendering detention unnecessary for the sovereign power of exclusion—and
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engender decidedly antihumanitarian practices. I conclude that courts must put
entry fiction to rest as a vestige of the past and recognize the constitutional due
process rights of all persons who are present and here in U.S. immigration
detention centers.
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INTRODUCTION
In fictione juris semper subsistit æquitas.
[In fiction of law, there is always equity.]
—William Blackstone, Commentaries 1
The man-made satellite streaking soundlessly across the blackness of
outer space. The dark, lustrous eyes of the dog gazing out the tiny
window. In the infinite loneliness of space, what could the dog possibly
be looking at?
—Haruki Murakami, Sputnik Sweetheart 2
On March 16, 1953—early in the atomic era and four years before the
inception of the space age—the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 3 rejected the constitutional challenge of Mr. Ignatz Mezei,
an eastern European immigrant held in indefinite detention on Ellis Island.
Out of an alchemy of Cold War suspicion and late nineteenth-century plenary
power doctrine emerged the Court’s clearest pronouncement of “entry fiction”
for detained immigrants: a declaration that a foreigner present in a U.S.
detention center is not in fact here—not even a person, for constitutional due

1. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *43.
2. HARUKI MURAKAMI, SPUTNIK SWEETHEART 8 (Philip Gabriel trans., 2001).
3. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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process purposes 4 —if first stopped at the border. Plenary power doctrine
maintains constitutional exception zones within U.S. immigration facilities,
where individuals subject to entry fiction are detained with minimal procedural
protections.
In real life, Mr. Mezei was of course a person. He spent a total of nearly
three years detained on Ellis Island, part of New York and New Jersey, and was
undoubtedly here. 5 But the Court decided it could not intervene in the actual
fact of his detention because he remained fictively outside of our borders. The
federal government’s sovereign authority to exclude immigrants, the Court
concluded, required it to look away. 6
While it was unfortunate the Court turned a blind eye to the plight of Mr.
Mezei during the McCarthy era, today’s entry fiction has morphed into a legal
blind spot of egregious proportions. From 1953 to the present, immigration
detention has grown by orders of magnitude. Around the time of Mezei, the
federal government operated only a handful of immigration detention centers 7:
most prominently the facility on Ellis Island, where Mr. Mezei himself was
held. In 2019, the government detained over 500,000 immigrants in facilities
throughout the United States, including tens of thousands of “arriving”
individuals deemed not to have “entered” our borders. 8 The Department of
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) use of detention authority, moreover,
increasingly exhibits an arbitrary and unchecked exercise of power.
Technological circumstances, too, have changed. At the time the Court
pronounced the necessity of entry fiction against Mr. Mezei, its capacity to
monitor him outside the walls of a detention center was sorely lacking compared
to the present day. In the early Cold War era, surveillance technology was
limited and nascent. When the Mezei decision came down in 1953, a single
object orbited the earth: our solitary moon, 1,738 kilometers in diameter,
384,400 kilometers away, was the planet’s only satellite for 4.5 billion years. 9
Four years after Mezei, in 1957, that changed with the Soviet Union’s launch of

4. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
5. Immigration authorities detained Mr. Mezei for nearly two years from 1950 to 1952 before
releasing him on bond in May 1952; after the Supreme Court’s decision in his case, he was redetained
from April 1953 to April 1954. See VINCENT J. CANNATO, AMERICAN PASSAGE: THE HISTORY OF
ELLIS ISLAND 372–74 (2009).
6. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215–16.
7. See Herbert Brownell, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Address Prepared for Delivery at Naturalization
Ceremonies (Nov. 11, 1954), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/12/11-111954.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQL5-AZJQ] (noting six extant facilities in the United States in 1954, prior
to the government’s decision to close all of its federal immigration detention centers that same year).
8. See infra Section V.B.
9. About the Moon: In Depth, NASA SCI.: EARTH’S MOON, https://moon.nasa.gov/about.cfm
[https://perma.cc/B9W8-2NZE].
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Sputnik I, the first artificial satellite in human history. 10 A month later, the
Soviets launched Sputnik II, carrying history’s first earthling (a dog named
Laika) into space. 11 These events ushered in the space age and revolutionized
modern telecommunications and surveillance technology.
Today, over 2,000 artificial satellites orbit the Earth. 12 Sixty percent are
communicative: enhancing radio, broadcast, and cellular technology. 13 Twentyfour NASA-owned satellites comprise the Global Position System (“GPS”),
which measures the location of communicating devices within one square
meter. 14 The GPS tracking of persons—on which DHS spends millions of
dollars per year to deploy against tens of thousands of immigrants—provides
nearly real-time location details and constant surveillance capability. Other
technologies abound, including new biometric identifiers, increasing digital and
photographic surveillance dragnets, and sophisticated data mining tools. DHS
has shown a limitless appetite for these technologies despite the serious civil
liberties concerns they raise. 15
Yet the Supreme Court has failed to reevaluate entry fiction against this
sea change in enforcement technologies or against the spiraling expansion of
immigration incarceration. Rather, entry fiction has persisted throughout the
years with little to no jurisprudential attention to shifting context. In 2018, the
Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez 16 suggested, but did not decide, that a
constitutional divide may persist between the rights of individuals in detention
who have formally entered versus those who have not. 17 The majority rejected
the Ninth Circuit’s limiting construction of immigration statutes as requiring a
bond hearing for both entered and unentered individuals after six months of
detention 18 —but left key constitutional issues unresolved. In 2020, when
considering the due process rights that individuals have with regard to their
10. NASA
Space
Science
Data
Coordinated
Archive:
Sputnik
1,
NASA,
https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=1957-001B [https://perma.cc/64E7-W9VM].
11. Eric Berger, The First Creature in Space Was a Dog. She Died Miserably 60 Years Ago, ARS
TECHNICA (Nov. 3, 2017, 8:40 AM), https://arstechnica.com/science/2017/11/sixty-years-ago-thefirst-creature-went-into-space-a-stray-moscow-dog/ [https://perma.cc/AZR8-QZ5U].
12. UCS Satellites Database, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclearweapons/space-weapons/satellite-database [https://perma.cc/6SC2-HH58] (Aug. 1, 2020).
13. Malcolm Ritter, How Many Man-Made Satellites Are Currently Orbiting Earth?, TALKING
POINTS MEMO (Mar. 28, 2014, 9:37 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/idealab/satellites-earthorbit [https://perma.cc/AZV3-7DU3].
14. Global
Positioning
System,
NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/
communications/policy/GPS.html [https://perma.cc/WQY9-P5FQ] (Aug. 7, 2017).
15. See infra Part VI.
16. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
17. Id. at 851–52 (suggesting that the lower court should revisit class certification because entered
class members may not be similarly situated to unentered class members with respect to their
constitutional rights, particularly given that the lower court “has already acknowledged that some
members of the certified class may not be entitled to bond hearings as a constitutional matter”).
18. Id. at 843–44.
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removal orders, the Court in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam 19
extended entry fiction to an individual who traditionally would have been
considered entered—although it did so in the unusual factual circumstances of
a petitioner apprehended just twenty-five yards north of the U.S.-Mexico
border. 20
Although jurists and scholars over the years and in contemporary times
have critiqued entry fiction, none have provided an in-depth assessment of its
origins and evolution as a legal fiction. I engage in that in this Article,
identifying intertwined reasons for entry fiction’s expiration, rooted in both
history and the present. The defining attributes of legal fiction reveal the
importance of aims and contexts: courts do not tumble down a rabbit hole unless
equitable goals and functional necessities demand an inversion of reality.
As I uncover, entry fiction in its early decades served explicitly beneficial
ends, rooted in courts’ stated desire to minimize the suffering of immigrants.
Today, those rationales have been forgotten. Entry fiction now helps enable a
massive, inhumane, and unnecessary detention infrastructure. It does so,
moreover, in tandem with DHS’s deployment of totalizing surveillance
technology deep within the United States. As physical imprisonment of
immigrants grows in scale and inequity, and as that imprisonment becomes
unnecessary to effectuate enforcement ends, shielding detention decisions from
constitutional scrutiny becomes increasingly indefensible. This Article
examines entry fiction seriously as a legal fiction and concludes that the
suffering it now imposes alongside its diminished present-day utility renders it
obsolete.
To ground my discussion, I first provide general background information
on entry and arriving, followed by an overview of legal fictions and their
function in law (Parts I and II). Next, I engage in a close examination of the
origins and evolution of entry fiction in law and jurisprudence, including a
novel rereading of Chinese Exclusion- and McCarthy-era cases to uncover
humanitarian underpinnings of entry fiction (Part III). These underpinnings
are, I argue, essential to understanding the origins of entry fiction—and yet
completely forgotten in the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence addressing
entry fiction both in the detention context in Jennings and in the admissions
context in Thuraissigiam.
I then examine the contemporary legal landscape of immigration
detention, including the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jennings and related cases
(Part IV). In subsequent parts, I document both historical and modern-day
immigration detention and surveillance regimes (Parts V and VI). Finally, I
build upon these prior discussions to reevaluate entry fiction as legal fiction,
19. 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
20. Id. at 1961, 1964.
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exploring each of the latter’s definitional hallmarks of function, equity, and
danger (Part VII). My discussion traces new relationships between territory,
sovereign power, and immigration enforcement capacities to demonstrate that
entry fiction no longer serves its purposes as a legal fiction and should be set
aside. Accordingly, the constitutional guarantee of due process should extend
to every person present and here in U.S. immigration detention.
I. BACKGROUND: ON “ENTRY,” “ARRIVING,” AND CRITIQUES OF ENTRY
FICTION
In detention centers along the U.S.-Mexico border, DHS officials screen
tens of thousands of newly arrived asylum seekers each year. 21 Many will pass
this screening, making a threshold showing that they are likely refugees and
thus acquire the right to seek asylum in immigration court. This does not,
however, ensure their release. Instead, the government chooses to detain many
thousands of these individuals while they pursue their cases in immigration
court, a process that takes months or even years. 22 Detention imposes heavy
costs on health and well-being, 23 while also undermining individuals’ ability to
find attorneys and prepare their cases. 24 When the process drags on, especially
due to appeals, many give up their claims altogether. 25
Differing detention regimes apply to asylum seekers—and immigrants in
general—depending on the technicalities of entry. Under U.S. immigration law,
a person effects an entry if they cross into the territory of the United States
either via inspection and admission by an immigration official or by intentionally

21. See Claims of Fear, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
stats/sw-border-migration/claims-fear [https://perma.cc/M7AG-LXFT] (last updated July 17, 2020)
(showing 38,399 arriving asylum seekers and 54,690 “apprehended” asylum seekers in fiscal year 2018).
Although numbers of cases dropped after the suspension of normal asylum screening operations during
the COVID-19 pandemic, over 20,000 asylum seekers nevertheless received credible fear decisions in
2020. See Semi-Monthly Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Receipts and Decisions, U.S CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/Congressional-SemiMonthly-Report-1-16-19-to-1-31-20.xlsx [https://perma.cc/X8UM-JF6C] (showing 21,774 total
credible fear decisions from December 2019 to December 2020).
22. See S. POVERTY L. CTR., NO END IN SIGHT: WHY MIGRANTS GIVE UP ON THEIR U.S.
IMMIGRATION CASES 5 (2018), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/leg_ijp_no_end_in_
sight_2018_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB8J-N33U] (“[Detained immigrants] may be held on
civil immigration charges for months, even years, before their cases are resolved.”).
23. See infra Section V.B.2 (describing hardships and health risks imposed by immigration
detention).
24. See S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 22, at 32 (explaining how remote immigration facilities
impede detained individuals’ access to counsel, including the fact that from 2007 to 2012, “66 percent
of people who were not detained had lawyers, but only 14 percent of detained immigrants had
counsel”).
25. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 22, at 5 (“[A]ll too often, detained immigrants, particularly
in the Deep South, give up on their cases because their conditions of confinement are too crushing to
bear.”).
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evading inspection while remaining free from restraint. 26 Even individuals who
cross between ports of entry and then immediately seek out a border patrol
agent are traditionally considered entered without inspection. 27
Individuals who present at a port of entry or are interdicted at sea,
however, are by and large considered unentered if not formally admitted by an
immigration officer. 28 In current immigration parlance, unentered individuals
are “arriving aliens” 29 and may include some persons with lawful permanent
residency 30 or other status—but the majority of arriving noncitizens in
detention are asylum seekers. 31 This designation as unentered/arriving 32
continues even if Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officials
26. See Z-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 707, 707–08 (B.I.A. 1993); Patel, 20 I. & N. Dec. 368, 370 (B.I.A.
1991); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated
by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”).
27. See Z-, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 707; see also IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK,
ch. 3, § I(A), at 61 (14th ed. 2015) (explaining in headers and text that “Lawful Admission, not Entry
is the Defining Concept,” but there remains “Continuing, But Limited Relevance of the Entry
Doctrine”); infra Section IV.A.
28. See Z-, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 708 (showing that an entry requires either admission by an
immigration officer or actual and intentional evasion). Individuals who present themselves—and are
thus not evading inspection—and who are not admitted have not satisfied either prong and, therefore,
have not entered the United States.
29. Regulations define an “arriving alien” as:
[A]n applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a portof-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien
interdicted in international or United States waters and brought into the United States by any
means, whether or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport.
An arriving alien remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)],
and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked.
8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2020). Unless quoting direct language, in this Article I use the term “arriving
individual” or “arriving noncitizen” in lieu of “arriving alien.”
30. Some lawful permanent residents who are arriving noncitizens are exempt from entry fiction,
however. See infra note 32 and Section III.G.
31. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1064, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that following
years of discovery, the record established that the overwhelming majority of arriving class members are
not lawful permanent residents but rather asylum seekers), rev’d sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138
S. Ct. 830 (2018).
32. For simplicity, in this Article I often use the terms “unentered” and “arriving”
interchangeably. As explained later in this Article, however, a small subset of arriving individuals is
not subject to entry fiction. See infra Section III.G. Some lawful permanent residents are considered
applicants for admission but nevertheless are exempted from entry fiction—and thus considered
entered even if presenting at a port of entry. See infra Section III.G (describing “double fiction”—the
lawful permanent resident exception to entry fiction); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (specifying
circumstances in which a lawful permanent resident is considered to be “seeking an admission,” and
thus arriving, if at a port of entry); Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1082 (explaining that several categories of
lawful permanent residents presenting at ports of entry are considered applicants for admission and
thus arriving individuals, but not subject to entry fiction). Nevertheless, the vast majority of arriving
individuals are likely unentered. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
arriving individuals to whom entry fiction applies are “likely the vast majority”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 565 (2021)

2021]

THE END OF ENTRY FICTION

573

transport them deep into the interior and lock them away in detention centers,
even for years. In fact, even upon release from detention (via the statutory
mechanism of “parole”), 33 such individuals are still not considered entered or
here. This fictive suspension of time and space, a legal freezing of bodies at the
threshold of entry, is immigration law’s entry fiction. In essence, the border
marks these individuals and trails them until their immigration cases are
resolved. As Leti Volpp succinctly put it, “[A] noncitizen can be spatially here,
but not doctrinally here, in the down the rabbit hole of immigration law.” 34
Recently, in Thuraissigiam, a majority of the Supreme Court extended
entry fiction—at least with regard to rights to admission (not detention)—to an
individual who technically entered under prior understandings. Immigration
officials encountered and detained Mr. Thuraissigiam not at a port of entry but
rather twenty-five yards north of the U.S.-Mexico border on the same day of
his crossing. 35 According to a majority of the Court, Mr. Thuraissigiam had not,
in these circumstances, “effected an entry,” 36 despite exhibiting the traditional
entry factors of a crossing free from restraint. 37 Although the majority decision
emphasizes the unique facts of Mr. Thuraissigiam’s case 38 —and limits its
holding to admissions decisions rather than detention decisions—it nevertheless

33. See infra Section IV.A (describing the parole process).
34. Leti Volpp, Imaginings of Space in Immigration Law, 9 L. CULTURE & HUMANS. 456, 463
(2012).
35. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2020).
36. Id. at 1982 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)).
37. The Court held that Mr. Thuraissigiam accordingly lacked constitutional due process rights,
beyond those provided by statute, with regard to his application for admission. Id. at 1982–83. It also
rejected his claim that statutory limitations on federal court habeas review on his application for
admission violated the Suspension Clause. Id. at 1968–69. However, with regard to the latter holding,
the Court expressly underscored the difference between (traditionally lacking) habeas rights in the
removal context and the far more robust habeas rights in the detention context throughout its decision.
See generally id. at 1970 (pointing out, for example, that “the historic role of habeas is to secure release
from custody”). Although I briefly analyze the ramifications of Thuraissigiam for my arguments below,
see infra notes 146–47, 423–25 and accompanying text, and although many of my arguments would also
support the elimination of entry fiction with regard to admissions/removal decisions, in this Article I
focus on entry fiction’s impact on due process rights in the detention context. While a thorough
contemporary assessment of entry fiction with regard to admissions procedures and removal orders is
outside the scope of this Article, it would be a fruitful avenue for future exploration. Thuraissigiam did
not deeply explore contextual or historical arguments based on evolving immigration law practices,
doctrines, or structures.
38. Subsequent federal court decisions have rightly limited Thuraissigiam’s holding in light of the
unique facts presented by Mr. Thuraissigiam’s manner of entry so close to the border. See, e.g., United
States v. Guzman-Hernandez, No. 20-cr-06001, 2020 WL 5585077, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2020)
(“The Supreme Court did not intend to allow for the parade of horribles that stems from expanding
the zone of constitutional inapplicability beyond the 25 yards in Thuraissigiam.”); see also United States
v. Ochoa-Quinones, No. 19-CR-57, 2020 WL 5750853, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2020) (declining
to extend Thuraissigiam to bar collateral attacks on expedited removal orders in the context of criminal
charges and noting that Mr. Thuraissigiam “was stopped 25 yards after crossing the border”).
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exhibits a troubling willingness of the current Court to expand rather than
curtail entry fiction.
The constitutional alterity of imprisoned bodies—foreign, and mostly
minority—under entry fiction has enormous ramifications for detained
immigrants. Statutes, regulations, and governmental policies withhold from
such individuals basic procedural protections against detention. Meanwhile, as
explained in detail below, the operation of entry fiction has limited their
constitutional due process rights against arbitrary detention. 39 In contrast, from
the outset of immigration jurisprudence, courts have recognized the due process
rights of individuals considered entered and within territory. 40
As explored in detail in Part III below, entry fiction in immigration law
first emerged during the era of Chinese Exclusion and was later extended to
cover rights in detention during the early Cold War in Mezei. Scholarly
critiques of entry fiction have been long running and severe. Writing soon after
Mezei, Professor Henry Hart found that decision (and a related one, United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy 41) so far afield from constitutional principles
that he described the Justices as “writ[ing] without authority for the future.” 42
He concludes hopefully with an open appeal to principle for lower courts and
successors. 43 Decades later, legal scholars responding to mass immigration
detention in the 1980s pointed out entry fiction’s absurdity and illogic, 44 as well
as its incompatibility with 1970s-era constitutional due process jurisprudence in
cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly 45 and Bell v. Burson. 46 Those decisions expanded
39. See infra Part IV.
40. For example, in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), the Supreme Court squarely
held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to “all persons within the territory of the United
States,” invalidating a statute (Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25) that imposed hard labor
without a jury trial upon Chinese immigrants found to be within the United States without lawful
residence. Id. at 235–38. As explained later in this Article, however, Wong Wing upheld detention in
conjunction with deportation (and exclusion) as necessary and permissible. See infra Section III.A. In
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), the Court rejected the arbitrary detention without a hearing of
a noncitizen who entered the United States just days before being detained by immigration authorities.
Id. at 101. Ms. Yamataya, a Japanese national, landed at the port of Seattle on July 11, 1901—just four
days prior to an immigrant inspector’s July 15, 1901 start of an investigation around her landing. Id. at
87. Rooting its discussion in principles of due process—although ducking the direct applicability of
constitutional due process rights to Ms. Yamataya—the Court held the immigration statutes did not
authorize arbitrary detention, even for an individual “alleged to be illegally here.” Id. at 101.
41. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
42. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1396 (1953).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Richard A. Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion—The Rights of Cuban Refugees Facing
Indefinite Detention in the United States, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 925, 970 (1984) (“The Supreme
Court must reexamine the doctrines of parole and entry and the doctrines’ currently devastating and
illogical effects on the vesting of individual rights.”).
45. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
46. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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the right to procedural due process in the context of civil deprivations. 47
Discussing Mezei and Knauff, for example, Professor Peter Schuck concludes,
“[E]xclusion’s extraconstitutional status has encouraged and legitimated some
of the most deplorable governmental conduct toward both aliens and American
citizens ever recorded in the annals of the Supreme Court.” 48
Although scholars disagree on how to allocate due process rights to
immigrants, there is growing consensus around the need to put entry fiction to
rest. Professor David Martin, for one, proposes eliminating entry fiction in
favor of differing due process protections based on the extent of a person’s ties
to the community. 49 Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff counters that such an
approach would fail to capture the weighty interests of newly arrived asylum
seekers—but unequivocally agrees that constitutional jurisprudence must “bring
the alien at the border out of the shadows and into the sunlight of the modern
world of due process” and thus eliminate entry fiction. 50
Further evolution of due process case law in the 1990s and 2000s in the
context of civil detention engendered new critiques of entry fiction. Examining
growing protections in the context of civil commitment and pretrial detention,
Professor David Cole argues for greater procedural and substantive due process
rights for immigrants in detention, including arriving noncitizens subject to
entry fiction. 51 He criticizes Mezei, in particular, for conflating the power to
exclude (and deport) with the power to detain and concludes that under modern
due process case law, the entry distinction cannot stand with regard to
detention. 52 The congressional overhaul in 1996, as explained below, shifted
immigration law’s focus from entry to “admission” in both substance and
procedure—and it, too, generated new critiques, particularly around
47. See generally id. (holding that procedural due process requires a meaningful procedure on the
issue of fault for an accident before a driver’s license can be suspended); Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (holding
that procedural due process requires a full evidentiary hearing before welfare benefits can be
terminated).
48. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984).
Professor Schuck observes that a “classical immigration system” rooted in restrictive nationalism is
giving way to new communitarian principles rooted in greater recognition of rights. Id. at 74. But he
cautions, “[This] is not to say that the particular forms that change is taking are inevitable.” Id.
49. David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and
Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 192 (1983).
50. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and “Community Ties”: A Response to Martin, 44 U.
PITT. L. REV. 237, 259 (1983).
51. David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J.
1003, 1007–08 (2002).
52. Id. at 1037 (“Thus, the exception for entering aliens announced in dicta in Zadvydas is founded
on a false conflation of the issues of entry and detention.” (discussing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001))); id. at 1033 (“Virtually without analysis, the Mezei Court extended the right-privilege
distinction that governed in Knauff [with regard to admission] to the distinct issue of indefinite
detention.”); see also Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence of
Plenary Power, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 118, 156 (2018).
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territoriality and rights. Professor Linda Bosniak contends that the shift away
from entry in immigration law further undermines the authority of Mezei and
takes the Supreme Court to task for its failure to fully grasp that change. 53 In
later work, Professor Bosniak critiques ethical territorialism—which, as
propounded by political theorist Michael Walzer and others, recognizes
individuals’ rights by virtue of their “being here”—by pointing to entry fiction’s
manipulations of territory. 54 The malleability that allows (among other things)
the indefinite detention of immigrants casts doubt upon the very project of
ethical territorialism and reveals distinctions between inside and outside to be
“chimerical.” 55
Suffice it to say entry fiction has not aged well in scholarly literature. Over
a century after its emergence, however, it persists. Yet, although many have
called for an end to entry fiction in immigration detention jurisprudence, the
doctrine has been underexamined as a legal fiction—including little scholarly
treatment of entry fiction’s origins and evolution. In one notable exception,
Professor Ibrahim Wani in 1989 explored “[i]llegitimate [u]ses” of legal fiction
in immigration law, including entry fiction, which he concludes served
“predominantly baneful purposes” in stripping rights from individuals. 56
Professor Wani’s earlier critique, however, predates current immigration
detention and surveillance regimes, and no contemporary scholarly work
evaluates entry fiction against the defining attributes of a legal fiction. My
Article fills this gap as the courts continue to grapple with the viability of entry
fiction under our present immigration detention regime.
II. LEGAL FICTIONS: DEFINITIONS, ATTACKS, AND DEFENSES
Legal fictions as a common-law device have a colorful history, generating
significant debate among scholars of many eras. 57 The most bitter dispute to
date arose in the eighteenth century between Sir William Blackstone and
philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Blackstone and Bentham’s drastically opposed
53. Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial Distinction, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 412 (2002)
(critiquing conflations of entry, admission, and presence in the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which suggested the continuing viability of entry fiction); see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 386–87 (2002) (“There can be no Mezei’s, no place on United States territory where
the U.S. government acts free from the restraints of the Constitution.”).
54. Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 389, 392–96 (2007).
55. Id. at 398, 402–03.
56. Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in
Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 51, 116–17 (1989). Professor Wani identifies sovereignty, as
well as the law’s failure to recognize immigration detention as incarceration, as other fictions in
immigration law. He concludes that those, too, serve baneful purposes. Id. at 54, 100, 116.
57. For an illuminating and thorough historical discussion, see generally Louise Harmon, Falling
Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990).
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normative views would frame later debates on legal fictions. As Judge Posner
observes, their disagreement in fact concerned the whole of English law, with
the former painting a rosy and approving picture of the English legal system in
his Commentaries, and the latter attacking what he viewed as Blackstone’s
dangerous and regressive complacency. 58
Blackstone engages in a serious defense of legal fictions. In the pithy
characterization quoted at the outset of this Article, Blackstone pronounces that
“[i]n fictione juris semper subsistit æquitas” 59 (in fiction of law, there is always
equity). Elsewhere in his Commentaries, he defines equity, “in its true and
genuine meaning,” as “the soul and spirit of all law: positive law is construed,
and rational law is made, by it.” 60 He continues, “[E]quity is synonymous to
justice; in that, to the true sense and sound interpretation of the rule.” 61 Thus,
legal fictions—in line with principles of justice—are “highly beneficial and
useful” to avoid erroneous outcomes, “mischief,” or “inconvenience,” and to
“prevent[] the circuity and delay of justice.” 62 In his view, under the constraints
of the common law and the wisdom of judges, “this maxim is ever invariably
observed, that no fiction shall extend to work an injury.” 63 He concludes with
qualified optimism that legal fictions are at most “troublesome, but not
dangerous.” 64
Bentham rejects Blackstone’s premises and rails against legal fictions in
the strongest possible terms. They are, in his view, exemplars of the corrupt
nature of the common law writ large. His metaphors abound: Legal fictions are
a disease and “cover for rascality.” 65 Lawyers, he says, “feed upon untruth, as
. . . [if] opium, at first from choice and with their eyes open, afterwards by habit,
till at length they lose all shame, avow it for what it is, and swallow it with
greediness, not bearing to be without it.” 66 Or, “in English law, fiction is a
syphilis, which runs in every vein, and carries into every part of the system the

58. See Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J.L. & ECON. 569, 570–71, 596 (1976).
Judge Posner’s account mounts a qualified defense of Blackstone against Bentham and many future
scholars to follow through the centuries.
59. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *43.
60. Id. at *429. In this same section of his Commentaries, he also seeks to dispel the notion that
equity is the sole province of equity courts, arguing against rigid notions that “the one [court of law]
judged without equity, and the other [court of equity] was not bound by any law.” Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *43.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *267.
65. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1775), reprinted in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 391, 511 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
66. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES (1928), reprinted in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 65, at 1, 59.
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principle of rottenness”; 67 the “pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense
of every instrument.” 68 He disagrees that they served equitable purposes,
pronouncing that “[f]iction is no more necessary to justice, than poison is to
sustenance.” 69
Incorporating aspects of both Blackstone’s and Bentham’s views in the
most influential modern treatment of the subject, Professor Lon Fuller
acknowledges the activist bent and negative potential of legal fictions, decried
so vociferously by Bentham—but expresses a qualified agreement with
Blackstone’s approval of their use. In Legal Fictions, he defines the eponymous
phenomenon as “either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial
consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having
utility.” 70 The legal fiction, he posits, generally results from “the law’s struggles
with new problems,” 71 where existing rules of law fail to allow proper regulation
of contemporary aspects of social life. Through legal fictions, judges introduce
“new law in the guise of [the] old,” essentially masking or tempering change. 72
But he recognizes in them an implicit risk: legal fictions, he believes, become
dangerous if jurists lose sight of their origins, and they may be subject to
“harmful application.” 73
67. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL
JURIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW (1821), reprinted in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 61, 92 (J. Bowring ed., 1962).
68. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1775), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 221, 235, n.s (J. Bowring ed., 1962).
69. JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 189, 582 (J. Bowring ed., 1962). Bentham castigates legal fictions, in particular,
for stealing power from the legislature, and he views the courts and the monarchy as partners in such
theft. He urges the codification of law by Parliament to cement legislative authority against overreach
by the King and courts, while also making law more accessible to the layperson. He was a strong voice
against what centuries later might be termed judicial activism by the courts. Id. at 552, 582, 826; see
also Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 147, 152 (1917) (commenting on Bentham’s
“vigorous attack on fictions”).
70. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967) [hereinafter FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967)].
Professor Fuller’s 1967 book compiles his earlier articles on the topic, including L.L. Fuller, Legal
Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (1930) [hereinafter Fuller, Legal Fictions (1930)].
71. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967), supra note 70, at 94; see also Wani, supra note 56, at 51.
72. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967), supra note 70, at 58; see also HENRY SUMNER MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO
MODERN IDEAS 25 (1861). Professor Henry Sumner Maine defines legal fiction as “any assumption
which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter
remaining unchanged, its operation being modified.” Id. Although wary of legal fictions due to this
obfuscation, Professor Maine has a more charitable view of their historical function than Bentham,
whom he chides for pouring “ridicule” upon “legal fictions wherever he meets them.” Id. at 26. But
Professor Maine nevertheless favors the “prun[ing] away” of legal fictions, id. at 27, which pose “the
greatest of obstacles to symmetrical classification” of law, id. at 26.
73. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1930), supra note 70, at 370; see also Hope M. Babcock, The Stories We
Tell, and Have Told, About Tribal Sovereignty: Legal Fictions at Their Most Pernicious, 55 VILL. L. REV.
803, 819 (2010) (“When courts so often repeat legal fictions . . . then the factual distortions become
institutionalized.”).
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In line with their functionality, Professor Fuller also describes legal
fictions as mortal. Thus, “[a] fiction dies when a compensatory change takes
place in the meaning of the words or phrases involved, which operates to bridge
the gap that previously existed between the fiction and reality.” 74 He
characterizes legal fictions as “scaffolding” that are “useful, almost necessary”
for a time but “removed with ease” once the need and use expire. 75
Drawing from these classic texts, scholars have identified three key
qualities of a legal fiction: falsity, function, and dangerousness. 76 Reading with
Professor Fuller, recent scholars characterize legal fictions as functional
problem-solving devices, allowing the common law to establish new principles
and to balance the need for stability with the need for flexibility. 77 Many have
also pointed out legal fictions’ inherent dangerousness, particularly where, as
Professor David Shapiro warns, jurists “coin or adopt metaphors and then forget
that they are only metaphors.” 78 Considering such downsides, others following
Bentham have called for legal fictions’ expiration as a general common-law
device in favor of clearer legislative rules. 79
Blackstone’s Commentaries also reveal a fourth quality: equity, which
Blackstone defines around justice. 80 Blackstone himself describes and defends
one such fiction, by which certain promises exchanged at sea were treated as
having taken place inland in order to fall under the jurisdiction of Westminster
74. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967), supra note 70, at 14.
75. See id. at 70.
76. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 57, at 15 (discussing dangerousness); Niki Kuckes, The Useful,
Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (“[T]here are three
[classic] qualities of a legal fiction: falsity, utility, and dangerousness.”).
77. For example, Professor Maksymilian Del Mar writes, legal fiction is an “instrument via which,
incrementally, the law gropes its way towards a principle.” Maksymilian Del Mar, Legal Fictions and
Legal Change, 9 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 442, 450 (2013). Similarly, Professor Craig Allen Nard describes
legal fictions as resolving a tension in the common law between the need for stability and the need for
flexibility. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Fictions and the Role of Information in Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1517, 1522–25 (2016).
78. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 733–34 (1987)
(discussing the fiction of corporate personhood). Professor Aviam Soifer also warns that legal fictions
can diminish full understanding of the law, “short-circuit[ing] attempts to comprehend the complexity
behind the assumptions a legal fiction conveys.” Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV.
871, 877 (1986).
79. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 78, at 740 (“To begin, I cannot help thinking that there is now
less need for these devices, and more awareness of their flimsiness, than in the past.”); Jeremiah Smith,
Surviving Fictions II, 27 YALE L.J. 317, 320–24 (1918) (urging expiration of legal fictions as unnecessary
in light of advances of jurisprudential thinking as well as codification of law). As Professor Louise
Harmon documents in a fascinating discussion, Roscoe Pound first emphasized danger inherent in legal
fiction and called on legislative authority to clear them away—but later came around to its functionality
and beneficial uses. See Harmon, supra note 57, at 11–12. Professor Peter Smith also identifies and
critiques several new types of legal fictions, such as fictions based on misreading of empirical reality
and fictions necessitated by “the law’s general imperviousness to social science and change,” among
others. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1439 (2007).
80. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *429.

99 N.C. L. REV. 565 (2021)

580

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

Hall. 81 Indeed, achieving justice underpins the traditional use of territorial
fictions in particular, which have generally expanded the jurisdiction of courts.
As Professor John Orth describes, in England, “[f]ictions made available some
convenient forms of action; they also unlocked the doors to the common law
courts.” 82 Professor Orth describes how each of the three medieval courts—
Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and the Exchequer—employed legal fictions to
enlarge their reach. 83 In perhaps the most famous example, in Mostyn v.
Fabrigas, 84 the King’s Bench considered a petitioner living in Minorca, a
Mediterranean island then controlled by England, to be a resident of London. 85
That territorial fiction allowed jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case of false
imprisonment and trespass, and thereby achieved just ends—as the petitioner
would otherwise have lacked a venue to challenge unlawful detention by his
governor. 86
Fictions of personhood also expand the reach of law, particularly its
remedial powers. Perhaps the most well-known legal fiction—corporate
personhood—allows corporations to enter into contracts, hold property, and
have resulting rights and liabilities enforced by the courts 87 (including recently,
a trend toward robust First Amendment rights). 88 The personality of ships
constitutes another such legal fiction. In The Carlotta, 89 the Second Circuit
conferred personality upon a tugboat so that those responsible for faulty towage
could be held liable, despite not owning the ship. 90 And, even apart from
fictions of territoriality and personality, examples of legal fictions that extend
the reach and remedial powers of courts—generally in furtherance of justice—
abound in the common law. 91
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at *107.
John V. Orth, Fact & Fiction in the Law of Property, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 65, 66 (2007).
Id. at 66–68.
98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774).
Id. at 1021–22; Orth, supra note 82, at 68; Frederick Schauer, Legal Fictions Revisited, in LEGAL
FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 113, 122 (Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining eds.,
2015).
86. Mr. Fabrigas lacked the practical ability to bring suit in Minorca because he needed the
approval of the same governor who was his custodian and defendant. Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1022.
87. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1129–30 (2011) (explaining and critiquing traditional
corporation theory that views the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” or a hub for contractual
relationships with resulting rights and responsibilities).
88. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–42, 365–66 (2010) (holding that First
Amendment political speech rights extend to corporations and striking down campaign finance laws
limiting expenditures on elections-related communication by corporations).
89. 48 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1931).
90. Id. at 112.
91. The fictions of “constructive trust” and “constructive fraud” ensure equitable remedies for
bad acts that fail to meet the legal requirements of a violated trust or perpetration of fraud, respectively.
See Orth, supra note 82, at 72. Implied contracts treat noncontracts as contracts—again to achieve just
ends, for example, by allowing recompense for labor reasonably undertaken in expectation of payment.
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In evaluating a legal fiction, context is critical; so, too, is its genealogy in
the law. As Professor Aviam Soifer observes, “[L]egal fictions do not hold still”;
and as they “are not static, they may grow to influence or even control how we
think or refuse to think about basic matters.” 92 With these overarching
principles in mind, I now turn to examine entry fiction in immigration and
constitutional law.
III. ON ENTRY FICTION: EMERGENCE, EXTENSION, AND JUSTIFICATIONS
From the Court’s earliest immigration cases onward, the concept of entry
has served as a critical hinge in the availability of certain protections. In both
statutory law and constitutional jurisprudence, a removal to land for purposes
of inspection was considered not to alter an individual’s status with regard to
immigration—or immigration-related due process. As I explain below, both the
statutory and jurisprudential origins of entry fiction had a decidedly functional
and humanitarian bent, in line with the expected use of fictions in law. But first,
I briefly describe plenary power doctrine, which established the federal
government’s sovereign immigration powers in darker and more problematic
ways.
A.

Plenary Power

Although locating regulation of immigration squarely within the powers
of the federal government is uncontroversial today, the Constitution in fact
provides no such enumerated authority. For over 100 years after this nation’s
establishment, no general immigration laws regulated migration, 93 and the free
flow of persons into the United States was recognized as a fundamental right of
persons as well as a benefit to the country. 94 In the late 1800s, however, a
Schauer, supra note 85, at 123. In property law, the treatment of children as invitees unto land even if
they are in fact trespassers achieves the equitable result of greater protection of children. Id.
92. Soifer, supra note 78, at 877.
93. But see An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800) (authorizing summary
expulsion of noncitizens considered to be dangerous); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801)
(acting in conjunction with An Act Concerning Aliens).
94. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 855 (1987). As Professor Louis Henkin explains, a
mid-nineteenth-century act provided as follows:
[T]he right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the
enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and . . . in . . . recognition
of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested
them with the rights of citizenship . . . .
Id. at 855 n.10 (citing An Act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign States, Pub. L.
No. 40-249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1731)). However, this did not
mean that the right to free migration was wholly embraced. Many state jurisdictions attempted to limit
migration. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993).
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backlash of xenophobia and racism against Chinese immigrants led to
Congress’s passage of the first major immigration law in 1882, 95 excluding
Chinese nationals. 96 Just prior to that law’s passage, a strong anti-Chinese
movement in California led to a number of restrictive state and local laws
targeting Chinese immigrants, but the Chinese community successfully sued to
invalidate them. 97 Californians called insistently upon the federal government
to intervene. 98
As Professor Louis Henkin observes, this backdrop provided a ready
impetus for the Supreme Court to source a federal power over immigration
from the Constitution. 99 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 100 the Court in 1889
did precisely that in order to uphold the blatantly discriminatory Chinese
Exclusion laws. Justice Field, writing for the Court, pronounced “[t]he power
of exclusion of foreigners” as “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated
by the Constitution.” 101 Accordingly, “the right to its exercise at any time when,
in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it,
cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.” 102 Even though
Chae Chan Ping lived and worked in the United States for twelve years and
secured an advance certificate authorizing his return, 103 the Court ruled that
subsequent laws of Congress nullifying permission to return (in violation of
treaty agreements) were a lawful exercise of sovereign power. 104 The decision,
moreover, both validated and extended racism against the Chinese. Justice Field
termed their large-scale immigration as an “Oriental invasion” and “a menace
to our civilization,” characterizing Chinese Americans as “strangers in the land,
residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their
own country.” 105

95. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat.
1084, and Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 38, 39 Stat. 874, 897; see also Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 971
F.3d 220, 230–31 (4th Cir. 2020) (providing a historical overview of federal immigration law), reh’g
granted en banc, 981 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2020) (mem.).
96. Henkin, supra note 94, at 855–56.
97. DANIEL ROGERS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES
SINCE 1850, at 7 (1988).
98. Id.
99. Henkin, supra note 94, at 856.
100. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
101. Id. at 609.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 585.
104. Id. at 609–10.
105. Id. at 595.
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In another decision invoking federal sovereign power as plenary 106 to
validate racist laws, the Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States 107 upheld the
expulsion from within the territory of Chinese immigrants who could not
establish their residency via testimony of “one credible white witness,” as
required by statute. 108 There, too, the Court deemed such authority an essential
aspect of sovereignty. In 1896, the Court in Wong Wing v. United States 109
explained that detention authority also rests in the federal government’s
sovereign power to effect both exclusion and expulsion:
We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part of
the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or
expulsion of aliens would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would
be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry
into their true character and while arrangements were being made for
their deportation. 110
But that same Court struck down a law that imposed a punishment of hard labor
absent indictment or trial—explaining that whereas detention served purposes
related to immigration laws, hard labor did not. 111
Not coincidentally, plenary power also became a cornerstone of federal law
on Native American tribes, as well as for the outlying territories of Guam, the
Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii. 112 In all these circumstances, plenary
power doctrine enabled the federal government to strip constitutional and legal
protections from those marked undesirable, foreign, and other. 113 Tracing and
106. Plenary power stands for the proposition that “the power of Congress over the admission of
aliens to this country is absolute.” See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination
and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (quoting 3 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 22.2(a) (2d ed. 1992)).
107. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
108. Id. at 729. Justice Field, however, dissented. For an in-depth analysis of both Chae Chang Ping
and Fong Yue Ting and Justice Field’s varying positions in each, see Victor C. Romero, Elusive Equality:
Reflections on Justice Field’s Opinions in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 165, 167
(2015).
109. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
110. Id. at 235. The case concerned an expulsion, not an exclusion, but the Court equated
detention’s link to both. Id.
111. Id. at 237.
112. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (examining
inherent powers of sovereignty over Native American tribes, immigrants, and territories in late
nineteenth-century jurisprudence); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion
Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 26–29
(2003) (examining the troubling legacy of plenary power cases to target and exclude those deemed
“Other”).
113. See Saito, supra note 112, at 26–29. Plenary power doctrine invoked in the Native American
contexts enabled, among other things, the wholesale theft of land by the federal government from
Native Americans in violation of prior treaty agreements. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
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critiquing its unjust and discriminatory origins, many scholars have called for
the end of plenary power doctrine. 114
Entry fiction, emerging from plenary power doctrine, cannot be divorced
from its ignominious roots and for that reason alone merits rejection. But even
if jurists shy away from eliminating plenary power over immigration—which
remains deeply embedded in juridical and public conceptions of federal
authority—entry fiction itself warrants separate scrutiny. Below, I document
how entry fiction emerged and expanded in immigration jurisprudence. Its
origins and evolution, I argue, have much to tell us about how to apply plenary
power doctrine today.
B.

Humanitarian Origins of Entry Fiction in Legislation

Although the earliest articulations of plenary power doctrine validated and
upheld the Chinese Exclusion era’s racist immigration laws, entry fiction
emerged within that space to serve more humanitarian ends in the same era. In
those days, immigrants arrived largely via boat and were ordinarily inspected
before disembarking. However, as Professor Charles Weisselberg explains, “By
the late nineteenth century, it became impossible to complete all immigration
inspections aboard vessels.” 115 As a result, Congress enacted legislation allowing
immigration officials to order temporary removal of immigrants from the vessel
for inspection purposes, but expressly provided that such removal to land did
not constitute a “landing.” 116 These “‘removal’ and ‘landing’ provisions were the

553, 561 (1903). Plenary power doctrine as set forth in the Insular Cases stripped persons in external
U.S. territories of certain constitutional rights, local self-government, and representation in U.S.
government. See generally Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 57 (2013) (providing an overview of the Insular Cases in arguing that Puerto Rico’s
colonial status pursuant to them violates both the U.S. Constitution and international treaty
obligations); see also infra Section VII.A (discussing prior context and later Supreme Court treatment
of the Insular Cases).
114. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 106, at 1 (arguing that plenary power doctrine must be reexamined
as its foundational cases are unsound); Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 212
(2003) (explaining that “liberal theory is more consistent with U.S. constitutional traditions” than the
views of plenary power advocates); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260 (“Apart from the weaknesses that they contain, the
principle of special judicial abstinence in immigration cases cannot be justified even as a matter of
precedent.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990) (“[Plenary power]
doctrine had long been under heavy fire from many quarters.”); Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A
Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 39 (1996) (“Stated in terms of
constitutional law: eliminate the plenary power doctrine and permit challenges to immigration laws
that discriminate based on suspect classifications such as race.”).
115. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen
Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 951 (1995).
116. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085–86, repealed by Act of
Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 38, 39 Stat. 874, 897.
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beginning of what has come to be called the ‘entry fiction.’” 117 An 1891 Act 118
provided
[t]hat upon the arrival by water at any place within the United States
of any alien immigrants it shall be the duty of the commanding officer
and the agents of the steam or sailing vessel by which they came to report
the name, nationality, last residence, and destination of every such alien,
before any of them are landed, to the proper inspection officers, who
shall thereupon go or send competent assistants on board such vessel and
there inspect all such aliens, or the inspection officers may order a
temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a designated time
and place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection is
made. But such removal shall not be considered a landing during the pendency
of such examination. 119
The Act further directed that “[d]uring such inspection after temporary
removal the superintendent shall cause such aliens to be properly housed, fed, and
cared for, and also, in his discretion, such as are delayed in proceeding to their
destination after inspection.” 120 This provision underscores that the impetus for
entry fiction was a humanitarian one, as reflected by the mandated provision
for proper care and housing and when considered in light of the hellish
conditions that it allowed immigrants to avoid. Passenger ships in the
nineteenth century were notoriously dangerous, some with such high mortality
rates that they earned the moniker “coffin ships.” 121 Countless individuals died
during the transatlantic journey to America. 122
A 1908 investigation by the Dillingham Immigration Commission noted
the “disgusting and demoralizing conditions” of traditional, non-steamer
immigrant ships 123 and concluded:
Considering this old-type steerage as a whole, it is a congestion so
intense, so injurious to health and morals, that there is nothing on land
to equal it. That people live in it only temporarily is no justification of
its existence. The experience of a single crossing is enough to change bad
117. Weisselberg, supra note 115, at 951.
118. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-551, 26 Stat. 1084, repealed by Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch.
29, § 38, 39 Stat. 874, 897.
119. § 8, 26 Stat. at 1085 (emphasis added); see also Weisselberg, supra note 115, at 951.
120. § 8, 26 Stat. at 1085 (emphasis added); see also Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 16, 34 Stat.
898, 903, repealed by Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 38, 39 Stat. 874, 897; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 15,
39 Stat. 874, 885, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, § 403, 66 Stat.
163, 279; Weisselberg, supra note 115, at 951 (citing and discussing these laws).
121. Marguérite Corporaal & Christopher Cusack, Rites of Passage: The Coffin Ship as a Site of
Immigrants’ Identity Formation in Irish and Irish American Fiction, 1855–85, 8 ATL. STUD. 343, 343 (2011).
122. Raymond L. Cohn, Mortality on Immigrant Voyages to New York, 1836–1853, 44 J. ECON. HIST.
289, 289, 294 (1984).
123. WILLIAM P. DILLINGHAM, U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N, ABSTRACT OF THE REPORT ON
STEERAGE CONDITIONS, S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 295 (3d Sess. 1910).
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standards of living to worse. It is abundant opportunity to weaken the
body and implant there germs of disease to develop later. It is more than
a physical and moral test; it is a strain. 124
The Dillingham Immigration Commission additionally described the
conditions:
No sick cans are furnished, and not even large receptacles for waste. The
vomitings of the seasick are often permitted to remain a long time before
being removed. The floors, when iron, are continually damp, and when
of wood they reek with foul odor because they are not washed.
....
When to this very limited space and much filth and stench is added
inadequate means of ventilation, the result is almost unendurable. Its
harmful effects on health and morals scarcely need be indicated. 125
First person accounts of the ships underscored their crowdedness and stench.
One passenger wrote in 1879, “Words are incapable of conveying anything like
a correct notion of the kind of den in which I stood among sixty fellowpassengers. . . . The stench, combined with the heat, was simply intolerable.” 126
Another writer who experienced the journey at the turn of the twentieth century
lamented that “more than 800,000 [people per year] come in ships whose
steerage conditions are unsanitary, unclean, often indecent, and throughout
unworthy.” 127
Preventing passengers from landing after such an arduous journey was
dangerous. As one historian described, “In the early years, conditions for
passengers remaining on board ships and banned from landing within city limits
[of Philadelphia] were extremely unhealthy and often aggravated by inadequate
food, poor accommodations, and the onset of winter.” 128 The passage of laws by

124. Id. at 299. The report continued:
And surely it is not the introduction to American institutions that will tend to make them
respected.
The common plea that better accommodations cannot be maintained because they would
be beyond the appreciation of the emigrant and because they would leave too small a margin
of profit, carries no weight in view of the fact that the desired kind of steerage already exists
on some of the lines and is not conducted as a philanthropy or a charity.
Id. The same report provided a description of inadequate sanitary conditions on ships. Id.
125. Id. at 296–97.
126. In the Steerage of a Cunard Steamer, PALL MALL GAZETTE (London), Aug. 9, 1879, at 11–12.
127. Kellogg Durland, Urgency of Improved Steerage Conditions 1906, 48 CHAUTAUQUAN, Nov. 1907,
at 383–84.
128. MARIANNE S. WOKECK, TRADE IN STRANGERS: THE BEGINNINGS OF MASS MIGRATION
TO NORTH AMERICA 149 (1999).
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Congress to facilitate inspections off ship via entry fiction thus allowed for a
humane alternative to dangerous and potentially lethal conditions on board.
C.

Humanitarian Origins of Entry Fiction in Jurisprudence Versus the Rights of
Entrants

A year after the passage of the 1891 Act, and three years after the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Chae Chan Ping, the Court considered the case of a
Japanese woman who was denied permission to land in the United States to join
her husband. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 129 the Court rejected Ms.
Nishimura’s due process claim and reaffirmed that
[i]t is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to selfpreservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe. 130
Although she was not subject to the nationality-based Chinese Exclusion laws,
immigration officers found Ms. Nishimura—a young bride in possession of only
twenty-two dollars—excludable as likely to become a public charge. 131 After she
arrived in the port of San Francisco by ship, she was transferred to the custody
of the Methodist Episcopal Chinese and Japanese Mission within the city. 132
But this, the Court determined, had no effect on Ms. Nishimura’s rights as to
landing:
Putting her in the mission house, as a more suitable place than the
steamship, pending the decision of the question of her right to land, and
keeping her there, by agreement between her attorney and the attorney
for the United States, until final judgment upon the writ of habeas corpus,
left her in the same position, so far as regarded her right to land in the
United States, as if she never had been removed from the steamship. 133
Thus, the fact of Ms. Nishimura’s landing and her transfer to the care of a
religious mission did not change her constitutional status with regard to her
rights to admission. But the Court in so holding emphasized the suitability of
the placement in a mission house over the more dangerous setting of the
steamship—reflecting entry fiction’s original purpose. 134
129. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
130. Id. at 659.
131. Id. at 652.
132. Id. at 653.
133. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 659–60; see also Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 229–30 (1925); United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905) (“The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to be regarded
as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction and kept there while his right to enter was
under debate.”). In Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925), the Court held that Ms. Kaplan, a young
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These mission homes were not jails but rather boardinghouses located in
dense urban communities that offered residents shelter, food, clothing,
transportation, and social services. 135 Professor Cindy Che-Wen Lin describes
the Gum Moon Methodist mission home in San Francisco in the late nineteenth
century as “show[ing] great humanity” toward resident Chinese immigrant
women, and concludes the mission home “lived up to the ideals of Protestant
social reform.” 136 Photographs of the Gum Moon Methodist mission home near
the turn of the twentieth century (in locations before and after the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake) 137 depict an overall nonpunitive character.

petitioner released from Ellis Island to the custody of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigration Aid
Society while her immigration status remained uncertain, was “in theory of law at the boundary line
and had gained no foothold in the United States” and thus could not derive citizenship via a statute
that applied only to children “dwelling in the United States.” Id. at 229–30. But notable here, too, is
the fact that entry fiction allowed Ms. Kaplan to be transferred to the custody of a religious mission,
and ultimately released to her father, without altering her immigration status. Id. at 229. Although not
as clearly articulated as in Nishimura Ekiu, the suitability of allowing placement of a minor to her father
instead of continued detention may underlie Kaplan as well.
135. See generally ESTHER CRAIN, THE GILDED AGE IN NEW YORK, 1870–1910 (2016)
(describing Christian mission houses in the 1880s as providing lodging, Bible study, clothes, meals, and
schooling); History, HEBREW IMMIGRANT AID SOC’Y, https://www.hias.org/history
[https://perma.cc/X44E-RU22] (describing the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society’s founding in 1881 and
the nineteenth-century shelter and aid provided to immigrants, including “dormitory space, a soup
kitchen and clothing”).
136. Cindy Che-Wen Lin, The History of the Oriental Home (1888–1942), 18 MCMASTER J.
THEOLOGY & MINISTRY 3, 23 (2017). The mission homes were complex spaces that sought to
inculcate residents with Protestant and Victorian values. Although they urged assimilation of residents
in many respects, the missionary women who ran the home also countered nativism and racism against
Chinese Americans at the time. PEGGY PASCOE, RELATIONS OF RESCUE: THE SEARCH FOR
FEMALE MORAL AUTHORITY IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1874–1939, at 117–21 (1990).
137. See Our History, GUM MOON WOMEN’S RESIDENCE, https://www.gummoon.org/history
[https://perma.cc/JH43-RVCX] (explaining the relocation of the Gum Moon Methodist mission home
after the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco).
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Figure 1: Gum Moon Residence Hall, original location 138

138. Chinese M.E. [Methodist Episcopal] Buildings. Girls Home & Church (photograph), in UC Berkley
Bancroft Library: San Francisco Chinese Community and Earthquake Damage, ca. 1906, CALISPHERE: U.C.,
https://calisphere.org/item/ark:/13030/tf3779n9bs/ [https://perma.cc/2VZR-N9UW].
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Figure 2: Parlor of Gum Moon Residence Hall 139

139. H42816 Gum Moon Residence Hall Parlor, San Francisco, California (photograph), in UMC
DIGIT. GALLERIES, http://catalog.gcah.org/omeka/files/original/53c94bb2fdca31f76b660d86cbf123c2
.jpg [https://perma.cc/MKN8-3Y7J].
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Figure 3: Street View of Gum Moon Residence Hall 140

140. H42818 Gum Moon Residence Hall, San Francisco, California (photograph), in UMC DIGIT.
GALLERIES,
http://catalog.gcah.org/omeka/files/original/65b33f46b04496f55af6529df9a96a2e.jpg
[https://perma.cc/WD5Q-JM5E].
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Figure 4: Dining Room of Gum Moon Residence Hall 141

In contrast to the Court’s approach in Nishimura Ekiu, however, the Court
in the 1903 case of Yamataya v. Fisher 142 recognized the applicability of due
process principles for entrants. It rejected arbitrary detention without a hearing
for Ms. Yamataya, a Japanese teenager 143 who had entered the United States
just days before apprehension by immigration authorities. 144 Rooting its
discussion in principles of due process, the Court held the immigration statutes
141. H42817 Gum Moon Residence Hall, Dining Room, San Francisco, California
(photograph), in UMC DIGIT. GALLERIES (1910–1930), http://catalog.gcah.org/omeka/files/original/
65b33f46b04496f55af6529df9a96a2e.jpg [https://perma.cc/WD5Q-JM5E].
142. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
143. Eleanor Boba, Supreme Court Rules in the Japanese Immigrant Case, Yamataya v. Fisher, on April
6, 1903. (July 3, 2018), https://historylink.org/File/20597 [https://perma.cc/73ET-CWY4].
144. Id. at 87. Ms. Yamataya, a Japanese national, landed at the port of Seattle on July 11, 1901—
just four days prior to an immigrant inspector’s July 15, 1902 start of an investigation around her
landing. Id.
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did not authorize her arbitrary detention, even though she was “alleged to be
illegally here.” 145
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on due process and Suspension
Clause rights in the admission context relies heavily upon Nishimura Ekiu, and
raises tensions with Yamataya, in extending entry fiction in that context. As
mentioned, the Thuraissigiam majority considered an applicant for admission
subject to the entry fiction with regard to his rights to admission, even though
technically he effected a crossing free from restraint. It read into Nishimura
Ekiu, moreover, an extremely broad view of sovereign power in applying entry
fiction to reject Mr. Thuraissigiam’s constitutional due process claim. 146 Yet the
Court’s fixation on the sovereign prerogatives derived from Nishimura Ekiu
completely ignores the humanitarian origins of entry fiction in that same case.
No equity-based arguments, nor desire to acknowledge or prompt humane
practices by the government, make their way into the Court’s view of entry
fiction in Thuraissigiam. Entry fiction, rather, is transformed into a bordermanagement tool, used to ensure the “governing [of] admission to this country”
by federal authorities and to prevent creating “a perverse incentive to enter at
an unlawful rather than lawful location” by individuals. 147 But this view forgets
that good governmental behavior vis-à-vis individuals—not simply expansive
governmental power, nor a desire to prompt certain individual behavior—
underlays entry fiction as well. That line of reasoning continued under entry
fiction’s later cases, explored below.
D.

Undercurrents of Humanitarian Function in Entry Fiction’s Cold War
Expansion

A half century later, in a case involving the exclusion of another foreign
bride, the Court reaffirmed the applicability of entry fiction in Knauff. 148 Ellen
Knauff, formerly Ellen Boxhornova, met and married Kurt Knauff, a civilian
employee of the U.S. Army and veteran of World War II, in her native land of
Germany. 149 The War Brides Act of 1945 150 thus authorized her admission as a
foreign spouse. Nevertheless, the Attorney General denied her admission for
unspecified security risks. 151 The Court upheld Ms. Knauff’s exclusion even
absent process or notice of the charges against her, pronouncing that with regard
to her admission: “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
145. Id. at 101.
146. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1981–83 (2020); see also id. at
1977–81 (discussing Nishimura Ekiu in the context of the Suspension Clause).
147. Id. at 1983.
148. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544–47 (1950).
149. Id. at 539; Appellant’s Brief at 3–4, Knauff, 338 U.S. 537 (No. 54). Ms. Boxhornova changed
her last name to Knauff after marrying Kurt Knauff. See Appellant’s Brief at 4, supra.
150. Pub. L. No. 79-271, 59 Stat. 659 (expired 1948).
151. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 540, 544.
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process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” 152 The Knauff Court did
not, however, expressly address Ms. Knauff’s detention on Ellis Island, where
she was held for nine months. Notably, the Supreme Court permitted her
release on bond while the case was pending. 153
Finally, in its clearest and harshest articulation of entry fiction, the Court
in Mezei held that Mr. Mezei, an excluded noncitizen from eastern Europe, had
no constitutional protections against prolonged, indefinite detention on Ellis
Island. 154 Mr. Mezei lived in the United States for over twenty years before
leaving the country to visit his ailing mother in Romania. He ended up stuck
behind the Iron Curtain for over a year and a half, and upon his stateside return,
the Attorney General deemed him a security risk and refused admission. 155 The
government kept Mr. Mezei locked away because it did not want to permit him
entry but could not effectuate his deportation. Several countries refused the
State Department’s requests to accept him. 156
The Court reversed the lower courts’ grant of habeas. It reasoned that “an
alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing” than those
who have “passed through our gates” and, referencing Knauff, concluded Mr.
Mezei was entitled only to whatever due process Congress chose to bestow. 157
Because U.S. immigration law provided him with no right to enter and no
protections against prolonged detention, it upheld his indefinite detention. 158
In Mezei, however, unlike in Knauff, the Court explicitly addressed
continued confinement on Ellis Island, framing detention as minimization of
hardship to Mr. Mezei as follows:
While the Government might keep entrants by sea aboard the vessel
pending determination of their admissibility, resulting hardships to the
alien and inconvenience to the carrier persuaded Congress to adopt a more
generous course. By statute it authorized, in cases such as this, aliens’
temporary removal from ship to shore. But such temporary harborage,
an act of legislative grace, bestows no additional rights. Congress
meticulously specified that such shelter ashore “shall not be considered a
landing” nor relieve the vessel of the duty to transport back the alien if
ultimately excluded. And this Court has long considered such temporary
arrangements as not affecting an alien’s status; he is treated as if stopped
at the border. 159
152. Id. at 544.
153. Ms. Knauff returned to custody on Ellis Island after losing before the Court but was
ultimately released after sustained advocacy on her behalf. See CANNATO, supra note 5, at 365–66.
154. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214–15 (1953).
155. See id. at 218–20 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (recounting the facts of Mr. Mezei’s case).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 212 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 215.
159. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Notable here is the Court’s explicit articulation of the social good wrought by
its position. In characterizing Mr. Mezei’s imprisonment on Ellis Island as an
alternative to the far more inconvenient and uncomfortable circumstance of
forcing him to stay on a boat, the Court framed his detention as an “act of
legislative grace” and generosity. 160 The Court clearly did not wish to trample
upon or disincentivize this grace.
A strong dissent by Justice Jackson countered the Court’s framing,
adopting a far less rosy and more fact-bound view of Mr. Mezei’s detention. In
sharply worded terms, he took issue with the majority’s positive gloss on his
three years of indefinite detention, rejecting the government’s disingenuous
argument that Ellis Island was a “refuge” for Mr. Mezei from which he was
“free to take leave in any direction except west.” 161 As Justice Jackson noted
astutely, “That might mean freedom, if only he were an amphibian!
Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of forces which keeps
him as effectually as a prison, the dominant and proximate of these forces being
the United States immigration authority.” 162 Justice Jackson explicitly
condemned the fictional aspect of these arguments, stating, “It overworks legal
fiction to say that one is free in law when by the commonest of common sense
he is bound.” 163 Accordingly, he concluded emphatically that due process
protections should extend to Mr. Mezei’s deprivation of liberty. 164
An obvious tension emerges between the majority (and government’s)
endorsement of entry fiction and Justice Jackson’s castigation of the same. Yet,
a common thread emerges from their disparate positions. Both insist that their
opposing views—permitting a fiction of nonentry for the majority and rejecting
the same for Justice Jackson—further a humanitarian end in limiting harsh
confinement. Whereas Justice Jackson underscores the reality of Mr. Mezei’s
indefinite detention on Ellis Island and seeks to address it, the majority worries
that absent entry fiction, the government would force immigrants to stay aboard
ships.
E.

After Mezei and Knauff: A Humanitarian End of Mass Immigration
Detention

The association of Ellis Island with the Cold War, driven in large part by
Mezei and Knauff, tainted the facility in the eyes of many Americans and became
a public relations issue. Newspapers widely condemned both decisions. 165 The
Court’s treatment of Ms. Knauff, the wife of a U.S. serviceman, drew especially
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 227–28.
See Weisselberg, supra note 115, at 958–64, 970–84.
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significant public backlash and led to intervention by members of Congress. 166
Both Mr. Mezei and Ms. Knauff were in fact paroled 167 into the country
following their adverse court decisions—belying the necessity of the detention
that the government so strenuously fought for. Indeed, the Eisenhower
Administration took steps to close Ellis Island permanently even as it defended
its use of the facility in litigation. 168 Ellis Island finally closed in 1954, shortly
after Mr. Mezei’s release during the spring of that same year. 169
On the first official Veteran’s Day, November 11, 1954, presiding over the
naturalization of 1,600 new Americans at Brooklyn’s Ebbet’s Field, 170 Attorney
General Herbert Brownell publicly announced the closing of Ellis Island and
all remaining federal immigration detention facilities. He explained:
Now, these problems of detention also have been studied intently. As
a result, we have formulated a new policy -- a policy which I am pleased
to announce today because I believe you will agree it will make a vast
improvement in one phase of your Government’s relations with
individuals. It is one more step forward toward humane administration of the
Immigration laws under the fine leadership of Commissioner Joseph M.
Swing.
In all but a few cases, those aliens whose admissibility or deportation
is under study will no longer be detained. Only those deemed likely to
abscond or those whose freedom of movement could be adverse to the
national security or the public safety will be detained. All others will be
released on conditional parole or bond or supervision, with reasonable
restrictions to insure their availability when their presence is required by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 171
Brownell’s announcement was in keeping with the promise of Mezei’s own
justification for entry fiction—to ensure a more humane operation of
immigration law.

166. As a war bride, Ms. Knauff garnered sympathy from a wide range of Americans, including
the full House which passed a private bill on her behalf. S. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). Although
the bill languished before the Senate and was not signed into law, Ms. Knauff eventually won her case
for permanent residency before the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Weisselberg, supra note 115, at
958–64.
167. “Parole” as used here refers to a release from detention without formal admission to the
country. See infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text (discussing parole statutes and processes).
168. See CANNATO, supra note 5, at 375.
169. Id. This closure also coincided with the imminent start of censure proceedings on the Senate
floor against Joseph McCarthy, for “his unwise investigation of alleged Communism in the U.S. Army
in the spring of 1954.” Id.
170. Olivia B. Waxman, Thousands of People Became American Citizens on the First Official Veterans
Day, YAHOO! FIN. (Nov. 10, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/thousands-people-becameamerican-citizens-160055345.html [https://perma.cc/NAR4-9AX3].
171. Brownell, supra note 7, at 5 (emphasis added).
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The Detention-Avoidance Function of Entry Fiction

In a case decided a few years later, Leng May Ma v. Barber, 172 the Court
echoed these themes of generosity and grace in considering whether individuals
paroled into the interior of the United States should be considered present for
purposes of statutory eligibility under the then “withholding of removal”
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). 173 Section 1253(h) provided the Attorney
General with discretion to decline to return individuals who would face
persecution or torture in their home countries but limited that relief to persons
“within the United States.” 174
The Court described parole as “simply a device through which needless
confinement is avoided . . . [that is] never intended to affect an alien’s status.” 175
Thus, “to hold that petitioner’s parole placed her legally ‘within the United
States’ is inconsistent with the congressional mandate, the administrative
concept of parole, and the decisions of this Court.” 176 The Court also expressed
a functional, utilitarian reason for the nonlegal effect of parole. It observed,
“Physical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule, and is generally
employed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond.” 177 It continued:
Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an enlightened
civilization. The acceptance of petitioner’s position in this case, however,
with its inherent suggestion of an altered parole status, would be quite
likely to prompt some curtailment of current parole policy—an intention
we are reluctant to impute to the Congress. 178
Thus, the Court deemed entry fiction’s operation with respect to legal status a
jurisprudential good: one that prompted fairer and more humane immigration
policies by disincentivizing detention. Specifically, entry fiction encouraged the
legislative enactment and administrative exercise of parole, which in turn
minimized the use of physical detention.
G. Entry Fiction’s Nonfunctions and Double Fictions
Entry fiction did not, however, generally curtail constitutional rights
unrelated to immigration. As Professor Aleinikoff explains, “Outside the
immigration process, aliens receive most of the constitutional protections
172. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
173. Id. at 188–89.
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). Section 1253(h) has since been superseded by the Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.),
which provides for mandatory withholding of removal as well as discretionary asylum relief,
incorporating the international law definition of a refugee. Id. §§ 201, 207–208, 94 Stat. at 102–05.
175. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 190.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 190.
178. Id.
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afforded citizens.” 179 Along these lines, courts have found that individuals retain
due process protections irrespective of immigration or citizenship status for
criminal processes, 180 parental rights, 181 and deprivation of property. 182 The
courts have also recognized detained immigrants’ substantive due process rights
with regard to conditions of confinement, including fundamental safety and
medical needs. 183 Indeed, in spring 2020, district courts ordered the release of
many detained immigrants with health issues on substantive due process
grounds, finding that the detention of medically vulnerable immigrants amidst
the COVID-19 pandemic likely violated their constitutional rights. 184 The
179. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L.
862, 865 (1989).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979), abrogated by United States
v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing the entitlement to Fifth Amendment rights
including those under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506,
1548–50 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
the Fifth Amendment due process right of an immigrant brought to the United States to testify in a
criminal case was violated); id. at 1549 (“[There is a] basic distinction, between a constitutional claim
that implicates the sovereign’s authority to control immigration and a claim that implicates no such
interests . . . .”).
181. Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 734–35 (7th Cir. 1985) (illustrating how Russian nationals’
parental rights were protected by the Fifth Amendment).
182. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491–92 (1931) (holding that a foreign
corporation was entitled to Fifth Amendment due process rights with regard to property and thus was
entitled to just compensation for taking by eminent domain).
183. See Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[W]hatever due process rights
excludable aliens may be denied by virtue of their status, they are entitled under the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands of state or federal
officials.”); Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
(determining that the “[p]laintiffs successfully plead a substantive due process claim” with regard to
conditions of confinement in an ICE facility operated by Geo Group, a private contractor). But see
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the
Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1147–51 (1995) (explaining how more
expansive recognition of substantive due process rights for conditions of confinement in immigration
detention in Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987), has given way to an unduly high
standard of deliberate cruelty or gross physical abuse in subsequent district court and court of appeals’
cases).
184. See Thakker v. Doll, 456 F. Supp. 3d 647, 658 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (holding medically vulnerable
petitioners are likely to succeed in their claim that ICE violated substantive due process rights in
exposing them to heightened risks of COVID-19 and ordering release); Basank v. Decker, 449 F. Supp.
3d 205, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (same); Castillo v. Barr, 449 F. Supp. 3d 915, 922–23 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
(same); Coronel v. Decker, 449 F. Supp. 3d 274, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (same). But see Dawson v.
Asher, 447 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1050–51 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (determining that petitioners are unlikely
to succeed in a claim that ICE detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violated substantive due
process rights and denying release); Sacal-Micha v. Longoria, 449 F. Supp. 3d 656, 665–66 (S.D. Tex.
2020) (“[T]he fact that ICE may be unable to implement the measures that would be required to fully
guarantee [petitioner’s] safety does not amount to a violation of his constitutional rights and does not
warrant his release.”); Coreas v. Bounds, 451 F. Supp. 3d 407, 430 (D. Md. 2020) (holding that in the
absence of any confirmed cases of COVID-19 in facilities and given newly instituted screening and
transfer procedures, petitioners did not establish a likelihood of success on their claim of ICE’s
deliberate indifference to health and safety). At least one successful petitioner who secured release was

99 N.C. L. REV. 565 (2021)

2021]

THE END OF ENTRY FICTION

599

boundary line of “border” thus does not allow U.S. officials to commit
unchecked transgressions against immigrants.
And finally, one of the most important ways the Court tempered the
danger inherent in entry fiction was a double fiction for lawful permanent
residents, whose ties and equities the Court did not wish to ignore. To
ameliorate the harshest impacts of entry fiction, it imposed a fiction of nonexit
for lawful permanent residents who only briefly left U.S. territory. In Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 185 the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General
lacked authority to exclude and detain a lawful permanent resident and seaman
returning from a voyage without a hearing. 186 The Court considered Mr.
Kwong’s constitutional status as “assimilate[d]” to “that of an alien continuously
residing and physically present in the United States” despite his short trip
abroad. 187 It accordingly construed regulations that would have deprived Mr.
Kwong of a hearing as limited to “‘excludable’ aliens who are not within the
protection of the Fifth Amendment” so as to avoid constitutional conflict. 188 In
treating Mr. Kwong as if he had never left the United States, the Court thus
created a fictional exception to entry fiction. A decade later, it extended this
double fiction in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 189 holding that a permanent resident’s
“innocent, casual, and brief excursion” abroad would not be considered a
departure that triggers excludability under U.S. immigration law. 190 Further, in
Landon v. Plasencia, 191 the Court later determined that the question of whether
a returning lawful permanent resident made an “entry” could be litigated in
exclusion rather than deportation proceedings—but reaffirmed that a
permanent resident is entitled to due process even in an exclusion hearing. 192
These lines of case law demonstrate two things: (1) that entry fiction and
its contours were fundamentally concerned with the smooth functioning of the
an arriving immigrant. See Complaint at 28, Thakker, 451 F. Supp. 3d 358 (No. 20-cv-480) (noting that
petitioner “was detained on arrival”).
185. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
186. See id. at 600.
187. Id. at 596.
188. Id. at 600.
189. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
190. Id. at 451–52, 462. The Fleuti Court considered whether a return from a brief afternoon trip
to Mexico constituted a new entry within the meaning of immigration laws, such that Mr. Fleuti could
be held excludable despite having accrued nearly four years of permanent and continuous residence
prior to his departure. Id. at 451–52. The Court held it did not and that Mr. Fleuti thus was not subject
to exclusion on the grounds of his homosexuality—which the agency had deemed a “psychopathic
personality.” Id. at 450–51, 462.
191. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
192. Id. at 32 (“We agree with Plasencia that under the circumstances of this case, she can invoke
the Due Process Clause on returning to this country . . . .”). Notably, the petitioner in Plasencia was
apprehended at the border while attempting to smuggle in unauthorized migrants—and the Court
made clear to distinguish her short trip abroad from Mr. Fleuti’s in being neither fully “innocent” nor
“casual.” Id. at 30–31.
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immigration system, and (2) that the Court was rightly concerned with the
potentially harmful consequences of entry fiction and thus willing to bend the
“purity” of sovereign control of the border.
IV. NEW IMMIGRATION DETENTION REGIMES AND IMMIGRATION
DETENTION JURISPRUDENCE
Until the late 1990s, entry served as a critical distinction regarding
statutory rights of individuals in proceedings—both in the form of those
proceedings and the substantive availability of immigration protections. 193 In
1996, however, Congress passed a new law, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), 194 which significantly altered that
status quo. The following sections briefly explain the significance of IIRIRA
with respect to the rights of entered versus unentered individuals in detention,
then examine post-IIRIRA detention jurisprudence. As I explain below,
unentered individuals in detention do not receive a bond hearing before a
neutral immigration judge under U.S. immigration law but instead can be
released from detention only via the discretionary exercise of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) parole by an immigration officer. The constitutional permissibility
of this statutory landscape remains contested.
A.

1996: Entry Versus Admission After IIRIRA

With the passage of IIRIRA, Congress eliminated the prior dual track of
exclusion immigration court proceedings for unentered individuals and
deportation immigration court hearings for entered individuals. It replaced
them with a single removal proceeding in immigration court 195 and a curtailed
administrative process called “expedited removal” that mostly bypasses
immigration court. 196
193. Those stopped at the border received less robust exclusion hearings, whereas persons in the
interior received more protective deportation hearings. See id. at 25–26 (explaining differences between
exclusion and deportation hearings); Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 451–52.
194. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 302,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
195. See id. § 304, 110 Stat. at 3009-587 to -597 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a).
196. See id. § 302, 110 Stat. at 3009-580 to -581 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)) (“If an immigration officer determines that an alien [is subject to expedited
removal] the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or
review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title
or a fear of persecution.”). In expedited removal, enforcement agents within DHS can both issue an
order of removal and quickly effectuate it, generally without an immigration court hearing. An
important safety valve exists, however, for asylum seekers, who must receive a screening for asylum
eligibility before being returned. This process, known as a “credible fear” interview, involves a
nonadversarial interview with an asylum officer and curtailed review by an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1235.6(a)(iii) (2019). Individuals who establish a credible
fear are referred for regular removal proceedings in immigration court, where they can pursue their
claims for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2019); id.
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Through these measures, Congress shifted immigration law’s prior focus
on entry to a new focus on admission, or the “lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 197
With that change, the formal act of entry now matters far less under U.S.
immigration law than formal permission to enter. Individuals without such
permission to enter—those who lack proper paperwork or who attempt to secure
admission via fraud—can be subject to expedited removal processes that bypass
the immigration courts. 198 Critically, the “applicants for admission” subject to
expedited removal include both arriving individuals (deemed not to have
effected an entry) and certain individuals who “enter without inspection.” 199
This statutory shift from a focus on entry to admission undermines the
persistence of a legal fiction that hinges on the technical fact of entry. 200 Indeed,
in Thuraissigiam, as explained, the Supreme Court recently deemed an applicant
for admission to lack due process rights with regard to admission into the
country despite not arriving at a port of entry. 201
But while entry no longer significantly impacts access to substantive
immigration status or the form of immigration adjudication, it continues to
serve an important distinction for detention processes. Department of Justice
regulations prohibit immigration judges from reviewing custody
determinations of arriving individuals stopped at the border and thus
considered not to have entered. 202 These individuals, detained under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1235.6(a)(ii)–(iii). Even after that point, however, they are not guaranteed release from detention.
See infra Section V.B. DHS refuses release to many asylum seekers who establish a credible fear. See
infra Section V.B.
197. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 301, 110 Stat. at 3009-575
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). Notably, individuals who do not make a lawful
entry—those who entered without inspection—are considered inadmissible, just the same as individuals
stopped at the border without proper documents. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
198. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii); id. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7). Specifically, § 1225 provides
that those without documents establishing admissibility, as well as those that procure or seek to procure
admission by fraud, are subject to expedited removal. Id. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1225 applies to
individuals who are arriving as well as to other individuals as designated by the Attorney General. Id.
199. Recent regulations expand expedited removal to individuals anywhere in the United States
who enter “without inspection” and have been present for two years or less (in addition to arriving
individuals). See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (directing expansion of
expedited removal); Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409 (July 23, 2019)
(expanding expedited removal). Previously, expedited removal applied only to entered individuals
apprehended within 100 miles of a land border and present in the United States for fourteen days or
less. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
200. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (discussing work of Professors Cole and
Bosniak).
201. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1983 (2020); see also supra notes
35–38 and accompanying text (discussing Thuraissigiam’s extension of entry fiction in admission
context).
202. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2019). But as described, some lawful permanent residents are
not subject to entry fiction despite being categorized as arriving. See supra Section III.G; supra note 32.
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§ 1225(b), 203 can seek release only by DHS through the mechanism of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) parole in DHS’s sole discretion. 204 In contrast, individuals who
have entered the United States and are detained under the general immigration
detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), receive a bond hearing before an
immigration judge. 205
In 2004 in In re X-K-, 206 the Board of Immigration Appeals extended the
regulatory right to a bond hearing to asylum seekers who entered without
inspection and were subject to expedited removal. 207 However, Attorney
General William Barr overruled In re X-K- in In re M-S- 208 and attempted to
deny entered individuals subject to expedited removal a bond hearing, 209 but a
federal district court issued a national preliminary injunction against his
decision. The court found it likely to violate entered individuals’ due process

203. Section 1225(b) contains detention provisions applicable to asylum seekers placed into
expedited removal who pass a credible fear, as well as provisions applicable to certain noncitizens
presenting at ports of entry who do not establish that they are clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that individuals who pass a credible fear
screening “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum”); id.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (providing for detention of asylum seekers during credible fear processes, and
if found not to establish such fear, until their removal); id. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (providing that an
“applicant for admission . . . shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding” if an immigration officer
“determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled” to admission).
204. Id. § 1182(d)(5). That section provides the government with discretion to “parole into the
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1235.3(c) (2019) (limiting arriving aliens to release on parole). The statute also specifies that “such
parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)(1) (2019) (providing a general
review by an immigration judge of an immigration officer’s custody determination for individuals in
removal proceedings). However, immigrants subject to certain criminal and security ground for
inadmissibility or deportability are subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1).
206. 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (B.I.A. 2005), overruled by M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019).
207. Id. at 734–35 (holding that immigration judge has jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing and
order release pursuant to “general custody authority” for individuals who enter without inspection, are
placed into expedited removal, have a positive credible fear finding, and are pursuing claims in removal
proceedings).
208. 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019).
209. Id. at 518–19. The Attorney General overruled X-K-, holding that the Board of Immigration
Appeals in the earlier decision had erroneously deemed individuals who entered without inspection
and were subject to expedited removal to be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and subject to the
immigration judge’s general custody authority. Id. He determined instead that such individuals are
detained under § 1225(b) and ineligible for a bond hearing. Id. The Attorney General’s decision altered
five decades of prior practice, which had consistently provided entered individuals with a bond hearing
since the inception of bond procedures in 1969. See Release from Custody by Special Inquiry Officer,
34 Fed. Reg. 8037 (May 22, 1969) (authorizing special inquiry officers to conduct bond proceedings);
Immigration Judge, 38 Fed. Reg. 8590 (Apr. 4, 1973) (amending regulation to define “immigration
judge” as interchangeable with “special inquiry officer,” such that immigration judges as of 1973 would
conduct bond hearings).
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rights as recognized by the Supreme Court since Yamataya. 210 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court’s analysis and upheld the injunction. 211
In short, the statutory detention regime as interpreted by the government
gives DHS enormous discretion over the detention of unentered/arriving
noncitizens, who do not receive a bond hearing and who can be released only
via DHS’s exercise of § 1158(d)(5) parole authority. These noncitizens face a
discretionary, process-stripped regime that the Trump Administration
attempted to apply to many entered asylum seekers as well. 212 And as described
below, the Court has continued to suggest a divide between the constitutional
due process rights of arriving versus entered immigrants in detention.
B.

Post IIRIRA: Entry Fiction’s Unresolved Status in Statutory and Constitutional
Jurisprudence

Litigants have brought myriad challenges to immigration detention
without a bond hearing—including for both arriving individuals and those
subject to criminal and security-based mandatory detention. In these cases, the
Supreme Court resolved key statutory issues but left many constitutional ones
open, including the scope and viability of entry fiction.
In 2001, in Zadvydas v. Davis, 213 the Court considered whether individuals
could be indefinitely detained pending removal ordered by an immigration
judge. A single statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), authorizes detention
for immigrants with a final removal order 214 and applies both to “inadmissible”
immigrants—including individuals who had not formally entered—as well as to

210. Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 387 F. Supp. 3d. 1219, 1231–32 (W.D. Wash.
2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 953 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, No. 20-234, 2021 WL 78039
(U.S. Jan. 11, 2021) (mem.); see supra Section III.C (discussing Yamataya).
211. Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 953 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Mathews and concluding that
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that they are constitutionally entitled to
individualized bond hearings before a neutral decisionmaker.”), vacated, No. 20-234, 2021 WL 78039
(U.S. Jan. 11, 2021) (mem.). The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated a portion of the lower court’s
injunction that ordered specific procedural requirements and a seven-day timeline for the bond
hearings. Id. at 1148–49. The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit in light of Thuraissigiam. Immigr. & Customs v. Padilla, No. 20-234, 2021 WL 78039 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 2021) (mem.).
212. In 2017, over 42,000 asylum seekers who entered without inspection were subject to
expedited removal despite establishing credible fear. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERV., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY FY 2017 INLAND CASELOAD (2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/
PED_FY17_CFandRFstatsThru09302017.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8NZ-39HD].
213. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Specifically, § 1231 authorizes detention beyond a customary ninetyday removal period for immigrants with a final removal order, and it applies to both inadmissible
immigrants—including individuals who had not formally entered and were instead paroled under
§ 1182(d)(5) into the country—and “removable” individuals who have effected an entry. Id.
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“removable” individuals who have effected an entry. 215 The provision is silent,
however, on the permissible length of detention. The government interpreted
it to authorize years of indefinite detention. 216
Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Breyer applied the constitutional
avoidance canon 217 to read an implicit reasonableness limitation into § 1231 with
regard to entered individuals. Under the Court’s reading, § 1231 authorizes
detention only for a presumptive period of six months, after which the
government must show that continued detention is warranted by the likelihood
of actual removal. 218 Justice Breyer explained, “Freedom from imprisonment—
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies
at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 219
The government relied heavily on Mezei in arguing against constitutional
due process rights for unentered individuals, 220 whereas petitioners and amicus
contended that subsequent due process case law and the 1996 overhaul of
immigration laws undermined Mezei’s legal authority. 221 The majority noted
“[t]he distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United
States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law” 222 to
underscore the due process rights of immigrants such as Mr. Zadvydas who had
entered—but it sidestepped Mezei’s continuing viability for unentered
individuals in detention. 223 In dissent, Justice Scalia characterized the Court’s
failure to neither apply nor overrule Mezei as “obscur[ing] it in a legal fog.” 224
215. Id.
216. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85. Mr. Zadvydas, for example, faced prolonged detention because
he was effectively stateless. Id. at 684. Born to Lithuanian parents in a German displaced persons camp
in 1948, Mr. Zadvydas attempted but failed to secure citizenship from Germany and Lithuania, and as
a result, neither country would accept his return. Id.
217. Under the avoidance canon—a “cardinal principle” of statutory construction—“when an Act
of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘[the] Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’” Id. at 689
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
218. Id. at 701.
219. Id. at 690. Justice Breyer rejected the government’s contention that its two regulatory goals
of “ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings” and “[p]reventing danger to
the community” justified indefinite civil detention. Id. Rather, he concluded that “[t]here is no
sufficiently strong special justification here for indefinite civil detention” because removal was a remote
possibility—defeating any “reasonable relation” between detention and the first purpose. Id. (alteration
in original). As for the second reason, Justice Breyer noted that § 1231 was not limited to particularly
dangerous persons. Id. at 690–91.
220. See id. at 692.
221. See id. at 694.
222. Id. at 693.
223. See id. at 694 (“Mezei does not offer the Government significant support, and we need not
consider the aliens’ claim that subsequent developments have undermined Mezei’s legal authority.”).
224. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Scalia criticized the decision for
“offer[ing] no justification why an alien under a valid and final order of removal—which has totally
extinguished whatever right to presence in this country he possessed—has any greater due process right
to be released into the country than an alien at the border seeking entry.” Id. at 704. As Justice Scalia
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As a result of the Zadvydas Court’s failure to resolve the applicability of
Mezei, the constitutional status of unentered/arriving noncitizens remained
contested. Litigation continued around constitutional and statutory limits to
post-order detention of these individuals. The lower courts were split on
whether Zadvydas applied to them as well and on whether nonentrants have
constitutional due process protections against detention. 225 In 2005, the
Supreme Court resolved the open statutory question in Clark v. Martinez. 226
Justice Scalia, writing for a 7–2 majority, construed § 1231(a)(6) identically for
inadmissible individuals, including those who had not effected an entry. 227 He
had of course disagreed with the Zadvydas interpretation—but in Clark he
concluded the limiting construction must apply to all individuals subject to
§ 1231. 228 Clark, however, left the constitutional status of unentered/arriving
individuals in detention unresolved.
C.

Jennings: Continuing Uncertainty and Criticism of Entry Fiction

In 2018, the Supreme Court heard Jennings, presenting yet another chance
for the Court to resolve the constitutional status of nonentrants in immigration
detention. Unlike Zadvydas, which addressed individuals with a final order,
Jennings concerned the permissibility of prolonged detention without a bond
would have held, Mezei does control petitioners’ circumstances, considering he found “no constitutional
impediment” to indefinite post-order detention. Id. at 705.
225. Compare Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the six-month
presumption of reasonableness in Zadvydas was inapplicable to inadmissible noncitizens, as individuals
who did not effect an entry do not present the constitutional issue avoided in Zadvydas), Sierra v.
Romaine, 347 F.3d 559, 576 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 1087 (2005) (mem.) (holding that
Zadvydas’s six-month presumption of reasonableness did not apply to an inadmissible noncitizen who
had never been admitted to the United States), Rios v. INS, 324 F.3d 296, 297 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
that petitioner was not entitled to relief under Zadvydas because he was an “excludable alien”), Benitez
v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the denial of Benitez’s § 2241 petition
because Zadvydas’s six-month presumption of reasonableness was inapplicable to inadmissible
noncitizens), rev’d, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), and Hoyte-Mesa v. Ashcroft, 272 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that “continued detention does not violate due process”), with Rosales-Garcia v.
Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 415 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that Zadvydas’s limiting construction applies to
Mr. Rosales-Garcia, an excludable Cuban national, who is safeguarded by Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process protections and whose indefinite detention accordingly raises constitutional
concerns), and Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that as a matter of uniform
statutory construction, Zadvydas’s limitation did apply to an inadmissible individual). Notably, even
before Zadvydas, the Third Circuit in Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999), recognized
the due process rights of an excludable Vietnamese national against prolonged detention; however, the
court deemed interim parole regulations adequate on their face to afford due process. Id. at 396, 398–
99. The Tenth Circuit in a 1981 decision construed an earlier detention provision as requiring release
of an excludable Cuban national whose detention was prolonged and whose removal was not
foreseeable, in order to avoid constitutional concerns. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d
1382, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981).
226. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
227. Id. at 379.
228. Id.
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hearing during the pendency of removal proceedings. 229 In a 2003 case, Demore
v. Kim, 230 the Court previously upheld the constitutionality of mandatory
detention without a bond hearing for brief periods for immigrants with certain
security or criminal grounds for removal, but did not address the
constitutionality of prolonged detention during immigration proceedings. 231
Demore did not present an issue around the constitutional status of arriving
individuals.
The plaintiffs in Jennings brought a class action challenge to detentions of
six months or more without a bond hearing for individuals with ongoing
immigration proceedings. 232 The class included arriving noncitizens detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)—including those subject to entry fiction—and
noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which prohibited release of
persons with certain criminal and security-related grounds for removal. 233 The
Ninth Circuit ruled that prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated
both § 1225(b) and § 1226(c), applying the constitutional avoidance canon to
read an implicit requirement of bond hearings after six months of detention. 234
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held
that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the avoidance canon. 235 The Court concluded
that the § 1225(b) and § 1226(c) could not plausibly be read to require bond
229. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).
230. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
231. Id. at 530–31. Demore—post-dating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, unlike
Zadvydas—specifically concerned the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which imposes detention
during removal proceedings without the possibility of bond or release for individuals with certain
criminal- and security-related grounds for removability. Id. at 513–14. The 5–4 majority decision in
Demore placed particular emphasis on the short nature of detention during the pendency of removal
proceedings, expressly relying on data provided by the Solicitor General showing an average length of
detention of forty-seven days. Id. at 529. As it later turned out, this calculation was incorrect and
severely undercounted the length of detention of individuals who appealed cases—leading to a
retraction letter years later from the Solicitor General’s office to the Court. See Letter from Ian Heath
Gershengorn, Acting Solic. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk of Sup. Ct. of
the U.S. (Aug. 26, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/demore.pdf [https://perma.cc/XKV5EN6F]. The Demore majority did not address whether prolonged detention would be permissible under
§ 1226 or the Constitution, and Justice Kennedy, a key fifth vote, wrote a separate concurrence to
expressly note that unreasonable delay may necessitate an individualized determination on flight risk
and danger. Demore, 538 U.S. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2015).
233. See id. at 1082.
234. In so doing, the court relied upon the fact that some arriving individuals are lawful permanent
residents not subject to entry fiction. See id. at 1082. Because their detention under § 1225(b) is not
differentiated from other arriving individuals, the circuit court applied the constitutional avoidance
canon to reach a uniform interpretation prohibiting prolonged detention without a bond hearing. Id.
at 1082–83 (“Because [lawful permanent residents not subject to entry fiction] are entitled to due
process protections under the Fifth Amendment, prolonged detention without bond hearings would
raise serious constitutional concerns.”); id. at 1083 (“The lowest common denominator, as it were, must
govern.” (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005))).
235. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018).
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hearings after six months of detention given that they make no mention of
timeframe and that to thus construe them otherwise would impermissibly
rewrite them. 236 The Court instead interpreted § 1225(b) and § 1226(c) to have
no limits on the length of detention 237 and remanded to the Ninth Circuit to
determine whether the statutes (thus construed) violate the Constitution. 238
Justice Breyer filed a lengthy dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor. He traced the historic right to a bail hearing under the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments; English common law, including Blackstone’s
Commentaries; and Congressional statutes from the time of the founders
onward. 239 He concluded that these sources collectively “point in the same
interpretive direction”: that denying bail proceedings even where detention
becomes prolonged would likely violate the Constitution. 240 In his analysis, he
handily rejected the government’s contention that arriving noncitizens fall
outside the Fifth Amendment’s protections. He first pointed out the absurdity
of entry fiction as applied to individuals held in immigration detention centers
squarely in U.S. territory and questioned, “Why should we engage in this legal
fiction here?” 241 Answering his own question, he concluded:
The legal answer to this question is clear. We cannot here engage in
this legal fiction. No one can claim, nor since the time of slavery has
anyone to my knowledge successfully claimed, that persons held within
the United States are totally without constitutional protection. Whatever
the fiction, would the Constitution leave the Government free to starve,
beat, or lash those held within our boundaries? If not, then, whatever the
fiction, how can the Constitution authorize the Government to imprison
arbitrarily those who, whatever we might pretend, are in reality right
here in the United States? The answer is that the Constitution does not
authorize arbitrary detention. And the reason that is so is simple:
Freedom from arbitrary detention is as ancient and important a right as
any found within the Constitution’s boundaries. 242
Justice Breyer concluded that the constitutional avoidance canon can and must
be applied to limit detention without a bond hearing to six months, including

236. See id. at 836 (“Under the constitutional-avoidance canon, when statutory language is
susceptible of multiple interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation that raises serious
constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an alternative that avoids those problems. But a court
relying on that canon still must interpret the statute, not rewrite it.”).
237. Id. at 844–48.
238. Id. at 851.
239. Id. at 864–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 869.
241. Id. at 862.
242. Id. at 862–63.
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for arriving noncitizens. 243 Yet his analysis did not more closely examine entry
fiction, either in its origins or present-day operation.
During and since Jennings, the government has advanced a broad and
sweeping defense of entry fiction in the detention context. Its briefing in
Jennings cited Mezei to buttress its view of entry fiction in over a dozen places
and repeatedly linked entry fiction to “sovereign prerogative.” 244 The
government also equated DHS’s use of detention with border control. 245 But
while the government has used detention toward (and beyond) these ends, it
also has other instruments for enacting border control and enforcement. I
examine both detention and surveillance practices below.
V. OLD AND NEW CARCERAL REALITIES
Detention practices have drastically changed in scope and form over the
past decades and centuries. Our contemporary mass immigration prison system
bears little resemblance to detention and custody practices of the Chinese
Exclusion era and vastly exceeds the scale of even very recent past decades.
Moreover, its present-day form is rife with abuse and inhumane conditions.
A.

Detention in the Past

The operation and impacts of entry fiction today differ markedly from the
time it first emerged. No longer do a majority of immigrants arrive by passenger
ship, and no longer does entry fiction prevent prolonged periods aboard deadly
nineteenth-century maritime vessels. Moreover, the earliest articulations of
entry fiction involved cases wherein authorities removed individuals from boats
to the custody of religious missions. Recall that in Nishimura Ekiu, the Court in
1892 declared mission homes a “suitable” alternative to dangerous ships. 246 As
described and depicted above, those mission homes were livable places—not

243. Id. at 876. During the pendency of Jennings before the Supreme Court and after its issuance,
several district courts adopted Justice Breyer’s dissenting view to hold that due process protections
extend to arriving individuals. The lower courts, too, have turned a skeptical eye on the use of entry
fiction to deny bond hearings, emphasizing the development of due process case law in the years since
Mezei and the centrality of bail for civil detention. See, e.g., Ahad v. Lowe, 235 F. Supp. 3d 676, 687
(M.D. Pa. 2017) (noting the “rising sea of case law acknowledg[ing] the historic development of due
process jurisprudence” and affording due process right to bond hearing to persons detained under
§ 1225(b)); Cruz v. Nalls-Castillo, No. 16-1587, 2017 WL 6698709, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2017)
(ordering hearing on due process grounds).
244. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners at 4, Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830 (No. 15-1204) (quoting
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)).
245. Id. at 19 (“Interim detention under Section 1225(b) is integral to protecting our Nation’s
borders.”); id. at 17 (“Section 1225(b) codifies the rule that has protected our Nation’s borders for a
century . . . .”).
246. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661 (1892); supra Section III.C (discussing
Nishimura Ekiu).

99 N.C. L. REV. 565 (2021)

2021]

THE END OF ENTRY FICTION

609

jails. 247 This is not to suggest that immigration detention throughout the
Chinese Exclusion era was entirely humane—the Angel Island immigration
station in San Francisco Bay, in particular, would later subject Asian immigrants
in particular to harsh and prison-like conditions. 248 But the Nishimura Ekiu
decision, which reflects humanitarian underpinnings of entry fiction, predated
the construction of the Angel Island facility, which operated from 1910 to
1940. 249
Immigration detention in the 1950s, the time of Mezei, also differed
markedly from today. Mr. Mezei himself was detained at Ellis Island, one of
the few federal immigration detention facilities at the time. 250 Although it had
famously served as a “gateway” to America and held millions of immigrants
from the 1890s onward, Ellis Island had long since ceased to house or process a
large number of immigrants. 251 And as described above, the federal government
closed not only Ellis Island but all remaining immigration detention centers in
1954, ceasing the practice of mass immigration detention in the aftermath of
Mezei. 252
B.

Detention in the Present
1. Scale

Although immigration detention lay relatively dormant for decades, the
1980s heralded its large-scale return in response to the “Mariel boatlift” of
Cubans and Haitian refugees. 253 The 1990s witnessed yet another period of
acceleration in tandem with the War on Drugs in the United States. 254

247. See supra Section III.C (discussing and depicting early mission houses).
248. See ERIKA LEE & JUDY YUNG, ANGEL ISLAND: IMMIGRANT GATEWAY TO AMERICA 57–
58 (2010).
249. Id. at 1, 26.
250. See Brownell, supra note 7, at 5–6.
251. See Ellis Island History, STATUE LIBERTY - ELLIS ISLAND FOUND., INC.,
https://www.libertyellisfoundation.org/ellis-island-history#Laws [https://perma.cc/6ARM-HCGS].
252. See CANNATO, supra note 5, at 375.
253. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (1984)
(“The effect of this influx [of migrants from the Caribbean Basin] upon detention was dramatic and
immediate; during 1982, more than one million person-days were spent in INS detention, almost
double the figure for 1980.” (citing Telephone Interview with Howard Brown, Off. Plan. & Analysis,
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. (May 10, 1983))); Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The
Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 579 (1998) (“Immigration
imprisonment was reinvented in 1981 in response to the massive immigration flow to south Florida in
the spring of 1980 that became known as the Mariel boatlift.”).
254. See Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 137 (2013) (“The federal government has increased the daily number of
individuals in immigration detention from 6,785 in 1994 to over 34,069 in 2012.”); César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014) (exploring
linkages between the War on Drugs and immigration detention).
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Expansion since that time has accelerated. From the 1990s to today,
immigration detention has morphed into a sprawling, multibillion-dollar
industry driven by both immigration enforcement policies and profit motives.
In 1995, then Immigration and Naturalization Service had a daily capacity of
less than 7,500 detention beds. 255 ICE now daily detains over 50,000 individuals
in its facilities nationwide, 256 or in fiscal year (“FY”) 2019, over 500,000 people
over the course of a year. 257 As explained, many thousands of these individuals
are arriving noncitizens subject to entry fiction and are detained throughout the
interior of the United States.
The Trump Administration continued to expand immigration detention
relentlessly. In its budget for FY 2020, the White House requested $2.7 billion
to increase daily detention capacity to 54,000 beds. 258 The majority of this
enormous budget went to private prison companies, which held seventy-three
percent of immigrants in detention in 2016. 259

255. DORA, SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/
pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AK2-9E75].
256. Hamed Aleaziz, More than 52,000 People Are Now Being Detained by ICE, an Apparent All-Time
High, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 20, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
hamedaleaziz/ice-detention-record-immigrants-border [https://perma.cc/YJ5S-ZGUC].
257. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2019 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT 5 (2019), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/
eroReportFY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EAQ-Y2XY] (showing 510,854 total “book-ins” to ICE
detention in Figure 7). In 2020, the number dropped dramatically to 182,869 people detained. See U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2020 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT 6 (2020), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annualreport/eroReportFY2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/73JG-FAN7]. This drop resulted from restrictions on
entry to the United States under COVID-19 policies and from temporary measures to reduce facility
populations to allow social distancing during the pandemic—not from any declared long-term change
in the use of detention authority. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE GUIDANCE ON COVID19, DETENTION (2021), https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus#detStat [https://perma.cc/99RR-PSH6]
(explaining efforts to reduce the number of individuals in detention facilities to seventy percent of
capacity or less during the pandemic); Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons from
Countries Where a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,061 (Mar. 26, 2020) (invoking
public health laws to suspend entry of individuals at land ports of entry and near land borders, with
certain exceptions, due to COVID-19).
258. U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
50 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/budget-fy2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FRN2-PT4M].
259. Michael D. Nicholson, The Facts on Immigration Today: 2017 Edition, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Apr. 20, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/
2017/04/20/430736/facts-immigration-today-2017-edition/ [https://perma.cc/F9ZC-42QY]; see also
Immigration Detention 101, DET. WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/
detention-101 [https://perma.cc/KB6Y-A7AY]. A number of county jails also contract with ICE to
detain immigrants, and they generally profit off these contracts as well. Immigration Detention 101, supra.
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2. Conditions
ICE’s prison-like facilities impose numerous hardships on individuals and
force many to give up their cases. 260 Detention impedes access to counsel and
jeopardizes the due process rights of individuals pursuing legitimate claims in
immigration court. 261 Abhorrent conditions in ICE detention centers have also
drawn widespread condemnation. Advocates, scholars, and researchers have
decried overcrowding, inadequate medical care, uninvestigated sexual violence
and assault, spoiled food, forced labor, and a host of other violations. 262 In June
2019, the DHS Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) released a report
expressing alarm over dangerous and unsanitary conditions in ICE detention
centers. 263 OIG based its conclusions on unannounced visits to four facilities
throughout the United States, including three owned by the private prison
company Geo Group. 264 OIG discovered rampant violations of ICE’s own
detention standards. 265 Across all facilities, it found food safety issues that
endangered detained individuals’ health and welfare, such as contamination,
spoilage, and expired food. 266 It also discovered persistent misuse of segregation
in three facilities, 267 and overuse of restraints and strip searches. 268 In two
260. See S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 22, at 5–6 (“[D]etained immigrants, particularly in the
Deep South, give up on their cases because their conditions of confinement are too crushing to bear.”).
261. Id. at 32–33.
262. See generally, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION
DETENTION IN THE USA (2009), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
JailedWithoutJustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/S85V-H67K] (reporting human rights violations in
immigrant detention facilities); KAREN TUMLIN, LINTON JOAQUIN & RANJANA NATARAJAN, A
BROKEN SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION
CENTERS (2009), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EUC6-APME] (detailing the failures of U.S. immigrant detention facilities); U.S.
COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES (2015), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/
Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKK9-5RK5] (describing the state of civil
rights at immigrant detention facilities); Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral
Age: Immigration and Imprisonment in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 429 (2011) (describing
the current state of immigrant imprisonment in the United States); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration
Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010) [hereinafter Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration
Detention] (detailing the immigrant detention regime in the United States).
263. JOHN V. KELLY, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION
FACILITIES (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2K6-MN8F].
264. The four facilities were Adelanto ICE Processing Center in California, LaSalle ICE
Processing Center in Louisiana, Essex County Correctional Facility in New Jersey, and Aurora ICE
Processing Center in Colorado. Geo Group Inc. owns and operates the Adelanto, LaSalle, and Aurora
facilities. The Essex County Department of Corrections owns and operates the Essex facility. See id.
at 2.
265. See id. at 2–3.
266. Id. at 3–4.
267. Id. at 3, 5.
268. Id. at 5–6.
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facilities, OIG investigators found extreme uncleanliness in the bathrooms and
other areas that presented risks of “serious health issues for detainees.” 269
Failure to provide basic hygiene items such as shampoo and toothpaste,
restrictions on visitation, and lack of recreation time posed further mental and
physical health risks to individuals. 270
Combined with inadequate provision of medical care, these conditions
have subjected detained individuals to dangerous and even deadly facilities.
Between January 2017 and June 2019, twenty-four immigrants have died in ICE
detention. 271 In a leaked memorandum dated December 2018, an ICE
supervisor notified the acting deputy director of ICE that “[m]any detainees
have encountered preventable harm and death” due to deficient medical care by
ICE, describing its health corps as “severely dysfunctional” and its leadership
as “not focused on preventing horrible recurrences.” 272 ICE’s own official death
reviews have also indicated that facility violations of ICE medical standards
contributed to the deaths of detained persons. 273 In 2020, twenty-one people
died in ICE custody, and over one-third had tested positive for COVID-19. 274
3. Arbitrariness
As explained, DHS claims unfettered authority to detain arriving
noncitizens who have not formally entered the United States, arguing that these
noncitizens lack constitutional due process rights against detention. Yet DHS
269. Id. at 8.
270. Id. at 7, 10–11.
271. Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, 24 Immigrants Have Died in ICE Custody During the
Trump Administration, NBC NEWS (June 9, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
immigration/24-immigrants-have-died-ice-custody-during-trump-administration-n1015291 [https://
perma.cc/EH2W-7LTA].
272. Ken Klippenstein, ICE Detainee Deaths Were Preventable: Document, TYT (June 3, 2019),
https://tyt.com/stories/4vZLCHuQrYE4uKagy0oyMA/688s1LbTKvQKNCv2E9bu7h
[https://perma.cc/V62S-SPSB] (linking a December 3, 2018 email from an ICE supervisor to Matthew
Albence, Acting Deputy Director of ICE, with the subject line “Urgent Matter”).
273. ACLU, DET. WATCH NETWORK & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., FATAL NEGLECT:
HOW ICE IGNORES DEATHS IN DETENTION 3 (2016), https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/
sites/default/files/reports/Fatal%20Neglect%20ACLU-DWN-NIJC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WP857JET]. This report from the ACLU documented extreme deficiencies in meeting the health care needs
of individuals in detention and found that violations of ICE standards contributed to nearly half of the
seventeen fatalities reviewed. Id. (“In nearly half of the death reviews produced by ICE, the
documentation suggests that failure to comply with ICE medical standards contributed to deaths.”);
see also US: Deaths in Immigration Detention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 7, 2016, 12:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/07/us-deaths-immigration-detention [https://perma.cc/WP3DKCC4].
274. Catherine E. Shoichet, The Death Toll in ICE Custody Is the Highest It's Been in 15 Years, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/us/ice-deaths-detention-2020/index.html [https://perma.cc/3WL4DGUD] (last updated Sept. 30, 2020, 8:11 AM); see also Detainee Death Reporting, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/detain/detainee-death-reporting [https://perma.cc/9PYK2H8R] (last updated Jan. 7, 2021) (click on “FY 2020” tab to expand the list of individuals who died
that year in ICE detention).
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also asserts that it uses this claimed unreviewable sovereign power justly,
providing unentered asylum seekers a meaningful opportunity for release even
absent a bond hearing before an immigration judge or fuller judicial scrutiny.
In Jennings, the government stressed to the Court that “[u]nder agency
guidance,” arriving asylum seekers who pass their credible fear screening
interviews “are ordinarily released if they provide sufficient evidence of their
identity and show they will not be a flight risk or danger.” 275 DHS has
characterized this “possibility of parole,” among other measures, as “afford[ing]
meaningful protection for aliens arriving at our borders and seeking to enter for
the first time.” 276
A 2009 agency directive (“2009 directive”) does, indeed, establish this
presumption of release for arriving asylum seekers who have passed screening
and are pursuing asylum claims in immigration court. 277 But recent court cases
demonstrate that DHS does not honor its own 2009 directive. In March 2018,
arriving asylum seeker plaintiffs across five ICE field offices—Los Angeles, El
Paso, Newark, Philadelphia, and Detroit—brought a class action lawsuit
challenging the systemic denial of parole. 278 They documented that in the five
field offices, denials of parole had skyrocketed from less than ten percent
between 2011 and 2013 to over ninety percent in 2017. 279
In July 2018, a federal district court agreed that ICE had systematically
violated its own 2009 directive by denying class members a meaningful
opportunity for release. 280 Moreover, the court found that ICE verged on
nonsensical reasoning in attempting to justify some of its decisions—for
example, by denying parole due to “flight risk” based on recency of arrival to
the United States. 281 As the court pointed out, the 2009 directive applies only
to arriving asylum seekers who categorically arrive recently. 282 The court issued
275. Brief for the Petitioners at 4, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204).
276. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 244, at 21; see also Supplemental Reply
Brief for the Petitioners at 7, Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830 (No. 15-1204) (contending that parole
determinations consist of “ample procedure on the issue of release during proceedings”).
277. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DIRECTIVE 11002.1,
PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR
TORTURE (Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 11002.1], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/
11002.1-hd-parole_of_arriving_aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3T4-MH2B].
278. Complaint ¶¶ 1–3, Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 18-578).
Although I am co-counsel in Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C. 2018), the views and
interpretations of Damus presented herein are strictly mine alone.
279. Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
280. Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 335–42 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260, 266, 268 (1954)) (finding that the plaintiffs established a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits that ICE had violated its own parole directive).
281. See id. at 341.
282. See id. (“‘[R]ecent entry’ is a categorical characteristic of most, if not all, asylum-seekers.”).
Of note, the court quoted the deposition of an ICE officer using the term “recent entrant” and was not
using the term “entry” in a technical legal sense. See id.

99 N.C. L. REV. 565 (2021)

614

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

a preliminary injunction directing ICE to follow its written parole policy,
including by applying a presumption of release. In Abdi v. Duke, 283 another
federal district court similarly found ICE’s Buffalo office denying parole in
violation of the 2009 directive and issued a preliminary injunction ordering
adherence. 284
Also troubling is the government’s use of parole denials to effectuate
family separation. In enjoining the separations in Ms. L. v. United States
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 285 a federal district court noted that DHS
separated many arriving asylum seeker families presenting at ports of entry,
despite its official stance that separation applied only to families who crossed
the border illegally. 286 For example, immigration agents separated the named
plaintiff, Ms. L., from her six-year-old daughter after they presented together
at a port of entry. They sent her young child S.S. thousands of miles away to a
facility in Chicago and locked away Ms. L. in an ICE detention center in San
Diego. 287 Although Ms. L. was eligible for parole under ICE’s 2009 directive,
ICE refused to release her. She and her daughter remained apart for almost five
months, until after Ms. L. filed suit. 288
These cases illustrate that, contrary to the government’s representations
in Jennings that arriving asylum seekers are ordinarily released, ICE uses
detention authority over arriving asylum seekers in arbitrary and inconsistent
ways. 289 In many cases, its denials of release have been illogical or inhumane.
VI. OLD AND NEW TECHNOLOGICAL REALITIES
Immigration detention over the past few decades has grown tremendously,
ensnaring more and more individuals who are often arbitrarily denied release.
Yet those changes in the detention system, massive though they are, are dwarfed
in comparison to the exponential proliferation of surveillance technology. Both
sets of changes—to the detention regime and to the surveillance regime—will
require reevaluation of entry fiction. I briefly examine the evolution of
immigration surveillance technologies below.

283. 280 F. Supp. 3d 373 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), vacated in part sub nom. Abdi v. McAleenan, 405 F.
Supp. 3d 467 (W.D.N.Y. 2019).
284. Id. at 381–82.
285. 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018), modified, 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 2019).
286. See id. at 1143.
287. Complaint ¶¶ 41–42, 54, Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. 18-0428).
288. Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1138.
289. Arbitrariness, of course, has also long been a feature of immigration detention. See, e.g.,
Simon, supra note 253, at 600 (“[T]he [1980s–1990s] INS immigration imprisonment campaign invokes
the earlier tradition of monarchical use of imprisonment as a site for enforcing undemocratic and
unaccountable political orders.”).
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Surveillance in the Past

In 1893, the entire Immigration Service, then under the Department of
the Treasury, consisted of 180 staff members. 290 Professor Beth Lew-Williams,
a historian, describes the early days of the Chinese Exclusion laws as
“impossible to enforce” due to the inadequate resources of immigration
inspectors. 291 She recounts the experience of one nineteenth-century inspector,
Arthur Blake, who wrote in 1883 of encountering five Chinese men likely
subject to the exclusion law but having no means by which to actually arrest and
detain them. 292 Summarizing his dire situation to his supervisors, he wrote, “[I]t
seems to me the Restriction Act is almost worthless.” 293 In terms of
technological capacity to assist in surveillance, Mr. Blake had the benefit of a
horse, 294 but mass electricity had yet to take hold in the country. 295
By the time of the Mezei decision in 1953, public electrical grids of course
extended throughout the United States. And in the post-WWII and early Cold
War period, the United States had a robust domestic surveillance and
intelligence infrastructure. Its operation, however, was dramatically more
resource intensive and less advanced than today. 296 Much of this surveillance
took place via human intelligence operations, requiring agents to collect
information from interrogation, direct observation, mail interception, or
archival research. 297 Building background files on individuals entailed manual
compilation of evidence and physical storage in shelving or file cabinets. 298
Although wiretapping technology allowed remote monitoring of phone
communications, this, too, required considerable human effort. Agents had to
physically trespass onto dwellings or structures to place the wiretaps and then
engage in hours of auditory monitoring. 299 Meanwhile, photographic
intelligence and terrain mapping, although possible, required pilots to fly
290. USCIS HIST. OFF. & LIBR., OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 4 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/History%20and%20Genealogy/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHisto
ry.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRT5-WWDR].
291. Beth Lew-Williams, Before Restriction Became Exclusion: America’s Experiment in Diplomatic
Immigration Control, 83 PAC. HIST. REV. 24, 43–44 (2014).
292. See id. at 43 (“Blake’s inability to arrest the five Chinese men highlights the myriad
enforcement problems federal officials faced.”).
293. Id. at 44.
294. See id. at 43 (“[H]is district was too large for one mounted inspector to monitor.”).
295. See UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INST., THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE
U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 3–4 (2016), http://sites.utexas.edu/energyinstitute/files/2016/09/
UTAustin_FCe_History_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZH9-UGSU] (recounting Thomas Edison’s
establishment of the first centralized direct current electrical power plant in Manhattan in 1882, which
had an extremely limited range).
296. See JOHN J. CARTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE STATE
1900-1960, at 143 (2016).
297. Id. at 5.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 144.
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physical planes over territory to capture images. 300 Today’s real-time tracking
of individuals, mass data collection, and machine-driven analysis simply have
no comparison in history. Below, I describe key features of DHS’s present-day
surveillance regime.
B.

Surveillance in the Present

Government surveillance capacity today vastly outstrips its distant and
even recent past. In just a few years’ time, the scale and scope of DHS
surveillance has accelerated tremendously. Below, I describe a few key
technologies that exemplify recent shifts in capacity. I focus first on
technological “alternatives” to detention, used directly against individuals
released from ICE custody. Then I explore recent programs that more passively
and broadly surveil immigrants (and citizens) in the United States.
1. Surveillance Alternatives to Detention
In 2003, Congress began a five-year pilot to provide additional options to
enhance “supervision” of persons released from ICE custody through a
combination of electronic surveillance and reporting requirements. 301 Called the
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”), the first iteration
operated from 2004 to 2009 in ten cities. 302 Congress provided approximately
$62 million in appropriations in 2008 for a second version of the program
(“ISAP II”), which expanded the pilot nationwide. 303 In 2014, Congress
accelerated appropriation to approximately $90 million for ISAP’s third
iteration (“ISAP III”). 304
Under ISAP III, ICE contracts with BI Incorporated to provide
monitoring services. 305 Notably, BI Incorporated is a wholly owned subsidiary
of the private prison company Geo Group, 306 which runs several major ICE
300. Id. at 137–38.
301. JOHN ROTH, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (REVISED) 3
(2015), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-22_Feb15.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZP4URRU].
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. AUDREY SINGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45804, IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVES
TO DETENTION (ATD) PROGRAMS 7 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45804.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CT2C-ZV4Q].
306. Company, BI INC., https://bi.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/6TGH-S59B] (“BI is a whollyowned subsidiary of The GEO Group, a global leader in the delivery of correctional, detention, and
residential treatment services to federal, state, and local government agencies.”). Geo Group’s
2018 Annual Report lists $2.33 billion in total revenues for the year. GEO GROUP, INC.,
2018 ANNUAL REPORT, pt. 2, at 3 (2018), http://www.snl.com/interactive/newlookandfeel/4144107/
GEOGroup2018AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A4E-VPZS]. From 2017 to 2018, Geo Care, the division
containing BI Incorporated, experienced revenue increases of $33.2 million “primarily due to increases
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detention centers, including three of the facilities described as alarmingly unsafe
in the June 2019 OIG report. 307 Geo Group received over $480 million in
federal funding under the Trump Administration for immigration-related
contracts. 308
ISAP is currently available nationwide in over 100 locations, covering
individuals in all of ICE’s jurisdictions. 309 As of June 2019, ISAP enrolled
101,568 persons in its programs—almost quadruple the 26,625 persons enrolled
in FY 2015. 310 In his FY 2020 budget, President Trump requested “$209.9
million for ICE’s Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Program, to monitor
120,000 average daily participants.” 311 As funding levels and the number of
immigrants monitored under ISAP steadily increased, however, detention
figures also continued to rise. 312 Thus, despite being framed as an alternative,
ISAP has supplemented rather than supplanted detention.
The ATD Program reported ninety-nine percent compliance rates with
court appearances, including ninety-five percent rates for individuals’ final
removal hearing. 313 Moreover, it has resulted in huge savings for the federal
government. Compared to detention’s cost of $137 per adult per day in FY 2018,
ISAP’s average cost for participation is only $4.16 per person per day. 314
ICE employs a range of technologies through the ATD Program. The
most common technology tool employed via the ISAP program is the GPS
ankle monitor, currently used for forty-six percent of participants—or tens of
thousands of immigrants under ICE supervision. 315 The GPS ankle monitoring

in average client and participant counts under our ISAP and electronic monitoring services.” Id. pt.
2, at 16; see also Nicolás Medina Mora, In America’s Broken Immigration System, the Best Business To Be
in Is GPS Trackers, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
nicolasmedinamora/in-americas-broken-immigration-system-the-best-b
[https://perma.cc/9ESBAKVP] (“How much money the federal government has paid B.I. is unclear; estimates range from
about $200 million to $375 million since the late 2000s.”).
307. See supra Section V.B.2.
308. Stef W. Kight, How Companies Profit from Immigrant Detention, AXIOS (June 8, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/private-prisons-immigrant-detention-8e5b3317-8ecf-476c-b91525330852e66f.html [https://perma.cc/5XZM-ZWV6].
309. SINGER, supra note 305, at 7 n.47.
310. Id. at 7.
311. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF 4 (2019) [hereinafter DHS,
2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0318_MGMT_FY2020-Budget-In-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ2J-2KDV].
312. Jason Fernandes, Alternatives to Detention and the For-Profit Immigration System, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (June 9, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/
news/2017/06/09/433975/alternatives-detention-profit-immigration-system/ [https://perma.cc/C6K9XPY2].
313. SINGER, supra note 305, at 9 (describing available data from FY 2011 to FY 2013).
314. Id. at 15.
315. Id. at 8 (“As of June 22, 2019, approximately 42% of active participants in the ISAP III
program used telephonic reporting, 46% used GPS monitoring, and 12% used SmartLINK.”).
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bracelet, which immigrants have termed a grillete, or ankle shackle, 316 enables
near real-time surveillance of its user. The device tracks location as frequently
as every fifteen seconds and retains historical mapping information recorded
every minute. 317
Forty-two percent of ISAP participants are enrolled in telephone
reporting through BI’s VoiceID system. 318 BI’s VoiceID system uses biometric
“voice print” verification to verify an individual’s identity. 319 It also ensures
“location compliance” via “a series of automated outbound calls to the client at
various approved locations, including work, appointments, school, or home.” 320
In the initial setup period, officers direct clients to create their “voice print”;
thereafter, BI’s VoiceID system verifies the client’s voice against the voice print
for subsequent check-ins. 321
BI’s latest surveillance tool, BI SmartLINK, is a cell phone application
that combines GPS monitoring with biometric scanning. According to BI, BI
SmartLINK “brings traditional analog supervision tools into the digital age by
combining them in a secure mobile application.” 322 It uses GPS technology to
capture location information and biometrics to verify identity during remote
check-ins. 323 ICE officers can also use BI SmartLINK to send push notifications
and messages to individuals. 324 Additional “modules” within it allow ICE
officers to receive documents from applicants, specify supervision terms, and
list upcoming appointments, including court dates. 325
In short, ISAP has grown enormously, saved the public huge amounts of
money, and proven effective in ensuring court appearances and removal. And,
as described below, ISAP III’s technology-based programs have significantly
expanded the surveillance capacity of ICE over immigrants released from
detention.

316. Kyle Barron & Cinthya Santos Briones, No Alternative: Ankle Monitors Expand the Reach of
Immigration Detention, NACLA.ORG (Jan. 6, 2015), https://nacla.org/news/2015/01/06/no-alternativeankle-monitors-expand-reach-immigration-detention [https://perma.cc/232Z-ENC4].
317. BI INC., BI LOC8 1 (2015), https://bi.com/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/brochures/loc8.pdf?
click=factsheetloc8#page=1&zoom=auto,-16,568/ [https://perma.cc/5MVM-K5MS] (“[BI] LOC8 is a
light, compact, one piece, ankle-mounted device that tracks offender location and community
movement in near-real time (as frequent as every 15 seconds). In standard operation, LOC8 searches
for a location fix multiple times per minute, and records the best point every minute.”).
318. BI INC., BI VOICEID (2015), https://bi.com/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/brochures/
FS_VoiceID.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6EK-4F7E]; SINGER, supra note 305, at 8.
319. BI INC., supra note 318.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. BI INC., BI SMARTLINK (2015), https://bi.com/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/brochures/
smartLINK.pdf?click=factsheetslink [https://perma.cc/UP3G-U7YE].
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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2. Passive Monitoring and Other Technologies
In addition to active monitoring programs that involve user awareness and
direct involvement, DHS has concerningly accelerated its use of passive
surveillance over broad swaths of the population. DHS describes its use of
technology “[w]ithin our Nation’s border” as helping it “find and remove bad
actors to ensure the safety of the American public” 326—although, as explained
below, the technologies extend to U.S. citizens as well. Below, I recount a few
key aspects of its more troubling recent expansions.
a.

Facial Recognition and Other Biometric Scanning

Perhaps the most alarming is DHS’s significant and ongoing expansion of
biometric scanning and surveillance. 327 Each iteration of President Trump’s
2017 “travel ban” executive orders contained provisions mandating enhanced
collection and use of biometric data. 328
In 2017, DHS released detailed plans for significantly expanded biometric
surveillance via a new Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology System
(“HART”). HART will replace the existing Automated Biometric
Identification System (“IDENT”) in incremental stages by September of
2021, 329 at estimated costs of over $250 million per year from 2017 through
2021. 330 DHS has contracted with the Swedish defense firm Northrop
Grumman for HART, 331 which will receive, store, and analyze biometric data
326. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF 1–2 (2018) [hereinafter DHS,
2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0318_MGMT_FY2020-Budget-In-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DWW-YP69] (emphasis added).
327. For an excellent overview of these technologies through 2014, and in particular the IDENT
system, see Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2014) [hereinafter Kalhan,
Immigration Surveillance].
328. See Exec. Order No. 13,815, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,055 (Oct. 24, 2017); Proclamation No. 9645, 82
Fed. Reg. 45,161 § 1(b) (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017);
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
329. See DHS Reveals Details of RFP for HART, PLANET BIOMETRICS (Mar. 9, 2017, 5:18 PM),
http://www.planetbiometrics.com/article-details/i/5614/desc/dhs-reveals-details-of-rfp-for-hart/
[https://perma.cc/7GVT-75H2]; PATRICK NEMETH, IDENTITY APPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2018/06/06/a1_12sep_1435_01_panel-dhsidentity_applications.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PER-YAPM]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-17-346SP, HOMELAND SECURITY ACQUISITIONS 74 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
690/683977.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WWL-QG87].
330. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 329, at 73 (showing estimated costs of
over $250 million per year from 2017 to 2021 and projected funding of over $200 million per year from
2017 to 2021).
331. In September 2017, DHS awarded the HART contract in the amount of $95 million to
Northup Grumman. Cal Biesecker, Leidos Protests DHS Biometric Database Award to Northrop Grumman,
DEF. DAILY (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.defensedaily.com/leidos-protests-dhs-biometric-databaseaward-northrop-grumman-2/ [https://perma.cc/T2H8-DZZJ]; Glyn Moody, DHS Expanding National
Biometrics Database To Hold Details on over 500 Million People, Including Many US Citizens, PRIV. NEWS
ONLINE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/2017/10/dhs-expanding-
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on individuals and enable interagency sharing of information. 332 Whereas
IDENT tracked only fingerprints and passport photographs, HART will
include those markers in addition to facial recognition; iris scanning technology;
DNA collection; and “additional biometric modalities,” such as scars, tattoos,
and palm prints. 333 HART will also engage in “analysis of relationship patterns
among individuals and organizations that are indicative of violations of the
customs and immigration laws.” 334 It will have the capacity to store at least 500
million identities in its database. 335
In FY 2020, the Trump Administration requested $269 million for its
Office of Biometric Identity Management, 336 an increase from FY 2019’s figure
of $253 million. 337 This growth will build upon an already enormous capacity.
In FY 2017, the Office of Biometric Identity Management reported processing
over “180 million biometric transactions on 108 million unique identities,”
resulting in the addition of 15.6 million unique individuals to its database in just
one year. 338 DHS has explicitly stated that it uses biometric information in its
database to identify not only individuals perceived to be terrorist threats but
also more general “visa applicants, foreign visitors, immigration benefit
applicants, detainees, and . . . immigration violators.” 339 Federal agencies
beyond DHS, including the Department of Defense and Federal Bureau of
Investigation, can also access the HART database. 340
DHS has also spurred and facilitated the use of these technologies by other
actors. As of 2014, DHS created a “Multi-State Facial Recognition
Community” to provide participating states and localities with joint access to
biometric information. 341 The Multi-State Facial Recognition Community
national-biometrics-database-hold-details-500-million-people-including-many-us-citizens/
[https://perma.cc/9MNW-Z6GY].
332. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 329.
333. NEMETH, supra note 329, at 8; see also Adrienne LaFrance, Biometric Checkpoints in Trump’s
America, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/
biometric-checkpoints-in-trumps-america/516597 [https://perma.cc/9EKF-8WY5].
334. DHS Notice of a New System of Records, 83 Fed. Reg. 17,829, 17,833 (Apr. 24, 2018). From
2013 to 2016, CBP implemented a pilot, the Southwest Border Pedestrian Exit Field Test, which
used facial recognition and iris scanning to identify individuals at the Otay Mesa land port of entry.
JOHN V. KELLY, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PROGRESS
MADE, BUT CBP FACES CHALLENGES IMPLEMENTING A BIOMETRIC CAPABILITY TO TRACK AIR
PASSENGER DEPARTURES NATIONWIDE 3 (2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
assets/2018-09/OIG-18-80-Sep18.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY2A-4MK3].
335. Moody, supra note 331.
336. DHS, 2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 311, at 12.
337. DHS, 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 326, at 60.
338. Id. at 57–58.
339. Id. at 58.
340. Moody, supra note 331.
341. Lee Fang & Ali Winston, Trump’s Homeland Security Team Likely To Emphasize Facial
Recognition and Biometric Surveillance, INTERCEPT (Jan. 19, 2017, 10:44 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/01/19/trump-dhs-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/2XA5-6CER].
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allowed users from “18 current participating states and fusion centers with the
single click of a mouse” to access biometric search tools. 342 Moreover, its
capture of biometric data extended beyond immigrants to all U.S. travelers,
including citizens—and to nontraveling citizens as well. In July 2019, the
Washington Post reported that ICE accessed millions of Americans’ photos in
state driver’s license databases without their knowledge or consent for its
facial recognition programs, drawing swift condemnation from members of
Congress and civil liberties groups. 343
Undeterred by these and other criticisms of its dragnet, DHS issued a
proposed rule in September 2020 to vastly expand biometric data collection. 344
The proposed rule provides that “every individual requesting a benefit before
or encountered by DHS is subject to the biometrics requirement unless DHS
waives or exempts it.” 345 It authorizes collecting biometrics of children of any
age—removing prior age limits on such collection for children under age
fourteen—and sweeps in U.S. citizens who sponsor family members for
immigration benefits. 346 And the proposed rule provides a far more expansive
definition of biometrics than used previously, which referred only to
fingerprints and photographs. The proposed rule’s updated list also expressly
includes DNA results, voice prints, and iris scans, among other identifiers,
and it specifies that photographs will include “facial images specifically for
facial recognition.” 347
DHS’s appetite for data has been limitless and brazen. The proposed
rule, if enacted, would greatly expand both the types of biometric data
routinely collected as well as the number of individuals subject to such
collection, including very young children.
b.

Automated License Plate Readers and Surveillance Drones

DHS has disbursed tens of millions of dollars in grants to fund localities’
use of license plate readers. These readers, comprised of high-speed cameras,
take photographs of each passing license plate. The reader systems capture and
amass huge amounts of data, storing the photographs, plate number, date, time,
and location of each passing vehicle. 348
342. Id. (quoting 2014 DHS budget documents).
343. See Owen Daugherty, FBI, ICE Using State Driver’s License Photos Without Consent for Facial
Recognition Searches: Report, HILL (July 7, 2019, 5:12 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/
451913-fbi-ice-using-state-drivers-license-photos-without-consent-to-create-facial [https://perma.cc/
F7QG-GTL8].
344. 85 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (proposed Sept. 11, 2020).
345. Id. at 56,340 (emphasis added).
346. Id. at 56,342.
347. Id. at 56,341.
348. ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING
USED TO RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 2 (July 2013) [hereinafter ACLU, YOU ARE BEING
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As early as 2012, DHS had distributed over $50 million in grants to fund
localities’ acquisition of license plate readers. 349 According to the website of
Leonardo Company, which manufactures license plate readers, DHS has
distributed “billions of dollars in grants” through its Infrastructure Protection
and Homeland Security Grant Programs. 350
In a 2017 privacy impact report, DHS Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) revealed extensive use of both traditional, stationary license plate
readers, as well as mobile readers mounted on CBP vehicles and covert plate
readers. 351 In addition, the report revealed CBP’s partnership with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to “leverage each other’s strategically
located LPR [License Plate Reader] systems.” 352
DHS also maintains a significant fleet of monitoring and surveillance
drones with satellite and camera technology. 353 Although DHS often describes
its drones as used at land and maritime borders, 354 in May 2020 it deployed a
Predator B drone to monitor protests in Minneapolis over the death of George
Floyd. 355 CBP confirmed in a statement that drone missions occur not only in
border regions but nationwide. 356 The New York Times reported later that
summer that DHS used a combination of surveillance drones, aircraft, and
helicopters to record at least 270 hours of footage of Black Lives Matter protests
in fifteen U.S. cities. 357

TRACKED], http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/
25NY-4XV5].
349. Id. at 25 (reporting that from 2007 to 2012, DHS issued $50 million in grants to fund local
jurisdictions’ acquisition of license plate readers).
350. Id. (quoting Grant Guide, LEONARDO CO., https://www.leonardocompany-us.com/lpr/howto-buy/law-enforcement-grants-guide [https://perma.cc/UHB5-K9BM]).
351. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR CBP LICENSE
PLATE READER TECHNOLOGY 5 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy-pia-cbp049-cbplprtechnology-december2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D24S-79B6].
352. Id. at 3–4.
353. See Science and Technology: Unmanned Aerial Systems, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/unmanned-aerial-systems
[https://perma.cc/QS7LH3PN].
354. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE:
ENABLING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/Enabling%20UAS.%20Factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/S349-NE9X].
355. Ryan Pickrell, Customs and Border Protection Flew a Predator B Drone over Minneapolis as Protests
Rocked the City, BUS. INSIDER (May 29, 2020, 6:29 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/cbp-flewa-predator-b-drone-over-minneapolis-amid-protests-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/7VXQ-CW9W].
356. See id.
357. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, U.S. Watched George Floyd Protests in 15 Cities Using Aerial Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floyd-protestssurveillance.html [https://perma.cc/T66X-8LFT (dark archive)].
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Surveillance by Social Media

Around 2010, DHS started monitoring social media somewhat modestly
to enhance situational awareness of major security-related events. 358 Under a
pilot program, officers scanned Twitter, Facebook, and blogs to identify and
report on unfolding events and disasters, including the Haiti earthquake, Deep
Water Horizon oil spill, and 2010 Winter Olympics. 359
By at least 2012, official use had expanded to operational functions
including “investigating an individual in a criminal, civil, or administrative
context [and] making a benefit determination about a person.” 360 In 2015, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) launched a pilot program for
systematic screening of the social media accounts of immigrant visa applicants
via an “automated search tool.” 361 USCIS tested a second and third automated
search tool in 2016. 362 That same year, ICE and the State Department began a
pilot program to surveil social media accounts of tourists and business visitors,
screening them during the initial visa application phase and beyond, 363 and CBP
began asking travelers from certain countries to disclose their social media
handles. 364
Since 2017, these programs have quickly accelerated. As mentioned,
President Trump made “extreme vetting” a central part of his 2017 travel ban
and refugee suspension executive orders, which centrally included social media
scanning. 365 Later that same year, DHS issued a notice regarding its intent to
358. See Sophia Cope & Adam Schwartz, DHS Should Stop the Social Media Surveillance of
Immigrants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/dhsshould-stop-social-media-surveillance-immigrants [https://perma.cc/5WXD-W7N2] (“DHS began
monitoring social media at least as early as 2010.”).
359. See id.; DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and
Ensuring Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism & Intel. of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., 112th Cong. 17–18 (Feb. 16, 2012) (statement of Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Priv. Officer, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec.), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg76514/html/CHRG112hhrg76514.htm [https://perma.cc/HQ3V-838A].
360. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INSTRUCTION NO. 110-01-001, PRIVACY POLICY
FOR OPERATIONAL USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 3 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/Instruction_110-01-001_Privacy_Policy_for_Operational_Use_of_Social_Media_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F29X-YFTD].
361. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS’ PILOTS FOR
SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING NEED INCREASED RIGOR TO ENSURE SCALABILITY AND LONG-TERM
SUCCESS 1–2 (2017), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-40-Feb17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8RWV-HB6H].
362. Id.
363. Id. at 3.
364. Tony Romm, U.S. Government Begins Asking Foreign Travelers About Social Media, POLITICO
(Dec. 22, 2016, 5:23 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/foreign-travelers-social-media232930 [https://perma.cc/776G-D9VJ].
365. See Exec. Order No. 13,815, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,055 (Oct. 24, 2017); Proclamation No. 9645, 82
Fed. Reg. 45,161 § 1(b) (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 § 5(a) (Mar. 6,
2017); Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); see also HARSHA PANDURANGA,
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modify “A-files”—noncitizens’ official governmental immigration file 366 —to
include social media handles, search results, and associated information. 367
Meanwhile, CBP airport searches of cell phones, laptops, and other electronic
devices increased nearly sixty percent in 2017, resulting in searches of 30,200
devices. 368 In 2019, DHS began requiring all applicants for a nonimmigrant visa
to disclose all of their social media handles, 369 and CBP announced a new social
media tracking program to monitor unfolding events. 370
DHS stores and analyzes social media information via a massive database
called the FALCON Search & Analysis System (“FALCON”). 371 FALCON,
constructed by the technology firm Palantir, allows ICE personnel to identify
patterns and trends in social media data as well as to discern connections
between groups, individuals, events, and activities. 372 Multiple data collection
systems across ICE and CBP feed into FALCON. 373
d.

Additional Data Mining and Analytics

The aforementioned dragnet and database systems do not even capture the
full picture. ICE owns over 900 unique databases and manages over 10 billion
biographic records. 374 It also contracts for other data mining and analytic
services. In 2018, ICE entered into a $2.4 million contract with Pen-Link,
which sells software that allows law enforcement agencies to collect and analyze

FAIZA PATEL & MICHAEL W. PRICE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., EXTREME VETTING AND THE
MUSLIM BAN 2, 16–17 (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
extreme_vetting_full_10.2_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRU7-5SV7].
366. These files, officially termed “alien files” and referred to as “A-files,” have served as the
official file of immigration transactions and records for individual noncitizens since 1944. Notice of
Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Sept. 18, 2017).
367. Id.
368. Ron Nixon, Cellphone and Computer Searches at U.S. Border Rise Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/politics/trump-border-search-cellphonecomputer.html [https://perma.cc/4P2E-JCDP (dark archive)].
369. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, NOTICE OF ACTION: ONLINE APPLICATION FOR
NONIMMIGRANT VISA (2019); FAIZA PATEL, RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, SOPHIA DENUYL &
RAYA KOREH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING: HOW THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY USES DIGITAL DATA IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 11 (2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019_DHSSocialMediaMonitoring_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7HF-UA23].
370. Adam Mazmanian, CBP Announces Social Media Tracking Program, FED. COMPUT. WK. (Mar.
27, 2019), https://fcw.com/articles/2019/03/27/cbp-social-media-watching.aspx [https://perma.cc/
C5MN-UZTL].
371. PATEL ET AL., supra note 369, at 27.
372. Id. at 23–24, 29, 40.
373. Id. at 28.
374. Jennifer Lynch, HART: Homeland Security’s Massive New Database Will Include Face
Recognition, DNA, and Peoples’ “Non-Obvious Relationships,” ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 7, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/06/hart-homeland-securitys-massive-new-database-will-includeface-recognition-dna-and [https://perma.cc/QG6D-CXNU].
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massive volumes of social media data and other internet information. 375 In 2017,
ICE signed a $20 million contract with West Publishing for access to its
CLEAR system, which combines large volumes of public and proprietary data
and offers a variety of analytic and mapping tools. 376 The CLEAR system
includes social network information as well as data from phone companies,
credit bureaus, utilities, motor vehicle registration in forty-four states, other
DMV records, real property records, records of persons, criminal and court
records, business data, and healthcare provider content. 377 An internal ICE
document describes the CLEAR system as necessary “to uphold and enforce
U.S. customs and immigration laws at and beyond our nation’s borders.” 378
✦

✦

✦

The most apt metonym for our present state of affairs comes from
Bentham (again), or more specifically, his Panopticon as taken up by
philosopher Michel Foucault. 379 Bentham’s 1787 plans—which back then might
have spared many prisoners from literal dungeons—conceived of an airy, light,
open building that would minimize physical restraints and cell walls via
architectural design. 380 Prison guards from a central watch tower could see
inmates throughout but remain unseen. Although actual, live watching of all
inmates at all times would be impossible, the possibility of being watched at any
time would normalize prisoners’ conduct. Foucault’s 1975 intervention rereads
Panopticon as an “indefinitely generalizable mechanism” that extended past
closed institutions to state apparatuses and throughout society by the end of the
eighteenth century. 381 Panopticism, or the “vigilance of intersecting gazes,” 382
allows disciplinary power to shape docile bodies through “tiny, everyday,
physical mechanisms” 383 (such as surveillance, cataloguing, training, and
timetables), which sustain and enlarge an asymmetry of power.

375. PATEL ET AL., supra note 369, at 23.
376. Id. at 24; see also THOMSON REUTERS CLEAR, THE SMARTER WAY TO GET YOUR
INVESTIGATIVE FACTS STRAIGHT. 2, 6 (2015), https://www.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/
openweb/documents/pdf/legal/fact-sheet/clear-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWQ2-MT6F].
377. THOMSON REUTERS CLEAR, supra note 376, at 2, 4–5.
378. PATEL ET AL., supra note 369, at 24; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, LIMITED SOURCE JUSTIFICATION: CONSOLIDATED LEAD EVALUATION AND REPORTING
(CLEAR) 2 (emphasis added), https://www.mediafire.com/file/y2e3vk65z6v3k6x/LSJ_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2B7G-95R4 (staff-uploaded archive)].
379. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200–02 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (analyzing Bentham’s Panopticon).
380. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE (1787)
(describing the Panopticon building and individual cells). Bentham also discussed the application of
Panopticon to hospitals, “mad-houses,” schools, factories, “poor-houses,” and schools. See id. at 4, 32.
381. FOUCAULT, supra note 379, at 216.
382. Id. at 217.
383. Id. at 222.
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Today, the virtual eyes of human and machine “guards” are everywhere,
and their intersecting gazes can and do watch over broad masses in real time.
Over a decade ago, Professor Jack Balkin drew upon Foucault’s conceptions of
knowledge and power to observe that we were already living in a “National
Surveillance State,” wherein the government “uses surveillance, data collection,
collation, and analysis to identify problems, to head off potential threats, to
govern populations, and to deliver valuable social services.” 384 Writing in the
aftermath of 9/11, sociologist David Lyon identified surveillance regimes’
roving “phenetic fix”: a trend toward “captur[ing] personal data triggered by
human bodies and [using] these abstractions to place people in new social classes
of income, attributes, habits, preferences, or offences, in order to influence,
manage, or control them.” 385
The evolution of capacity in recent years “has not been incremental, but
abrupt,” as scholar Alex Abdo notes. 386 Whereas previously, “the government
had to rely on human agents or informants to spy, today it spies through a
proliferating network of unsleeping sensors.” 387 Professor Erin Murphy
similarly identifies an “explosion in technologies” that enables regulation of
populations absent physical control. 388 These technologies lower the cost of
ubiquitous surveillance so much so that, as Professor Elizabeth Joh predicts, it
will soon “be feasible and affordable for the government to record, store, and
analyze nearly everything people do.” 389
The federal government has been a primary driver for these technologies;
within it, DHS’s footprint is enormous. As Professor Kalhan observed in 2014,
adapting Professor Balkin’s terminology, a new immigration surveillance state
has enacted a “sea change in the underlying nature of immigration regulation
itself.” 390 DHS has done so, moreover, largely without oversight or restraint. 391
In just a few short years since Professor Kalhan’s lucid exploration, immigration
surveillance has proliferated even more drastically.
Unsurprisingly, DHS’s spiraling surveillance dragnet has drawn
condemnation from defenders of civil liberties. Advocates have expressed

384. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3
(2008).
385. David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: Understanding Visibility, Mobility and the Phenetic Fix, 1
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y. 1, 3 (2002).
386. Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment To Do the Work of the First?, 127 YALE L.J.F.
444, 446 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-rely-on-the-fourth-amendment-to-dothe-work-of-the-first [https://perma.cc/8YUT-LGL5].
387. Id.
388. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2008).
389. Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing,
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 15–16 (2016).
390. Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, supra note 327, at 5.
391. See id. at 75–76.
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fitting alarm over its use against noncitizens and citizens, 392 particularly Muslim
Americans. 393 Among the more troubling aspects of DHS surveillance is its
apparent trampling of First Amendment rights. Leaked documents from
March 2019 revealed that DHS was tracking fifty-nine journalists,
photographers, and advocates—including forty U.S. citizens—who worked
with or reported on the migrant caravan in Mexico. 394 CBP officers have
flagged pastors, attorneys, and activists on the list for “secondary inspection”
when returning from Mexico. 395 Several such individuals reported threats,
detention, interrogation, and deportation by U.S. or Mexican immigration
authorities at border ports of entry. 396 ICE, meanwhile, has been criticized for
surveilling protests, unmoored from any apparent immigration function. A
leaked ICE spreadsheet revealed its tracking of protests in New York City in
July and August 2018, containing the names of sponsors, the political goals of
the protest, and the numbers of people signing up to attend on Facebook. 397
And, as mentioned, DHS in summer 2020 deployed surveillance aircraft,
including drones, to monitor and record Black Lives Matter protests in over
a dozen U.S. cities. 398
Continuous, pervasive, and intrusive forms of monitoring raise a host of
constitutional concerns, including unwarranted search, discriminatory targeting
on the basis of race and religion, and chilling effects on speech and
association. 399 The proliferation of electronic surveillance technology in the
criminal justice system has garnered trenchant criticism for advancing racialized

392. See, e.g., ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED, supra note 348, at 2; Abdo, supra note 386, at
446–47.
393. See PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 365, at 16–18.
394. Tom Jones, Mari Payton & Bill Feather, Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S.
Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates Through a Secret Database, NBC
SAN DIEGO,
https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-theUS-Government-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.html
[https://perma.cc/SK5S-QTHW] (Jan. 10, 2020, 11:43 AM); Photos: Leaked Documents
Show
Government Tracking Journalists, Immigration Advocates, NBC SAN DIEGO,
https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/photos-leaked-documents-to-nbc-7-investigates-113/126760/ [https://perma.cc/BUY3-2HWT] (June 15, 2020, 8:44 AM).
395. Tom Jones, Mari Payton, Bill Feather & Paul Krueger, Human Rights Organization Calls for
End to Controversial Border Surveillance, NBC SAN DIEGO, https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/
local/International-Human-Rights-Organization-Demands-Immediate-End-to-Controversial-USGovernment-Border-Surveillance-Tactics-512098411.html [https://perma.cc/W2FQ-AST5] (July 3,
2019, 11:35 AM).
396. Id.
397. Jimmy Tobias, Exclusive: ICE Has Kept Tabs on ‘Anti-Trump’ Protests in New York City,
NATION (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/ice-immigration-protest-spreadsheettracking/ [https://perma.cc/Y7D3-PFZ7].
398. Kanno-Youngs, supra note 357.
399. See generally ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED, supra note 348 (identifying the various
constitutional concerns arising out of the use of license plate readers).
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“e-carceration” in lieu of decarceration. 400 Although delving into the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendment implications of DHS surveillance is beyond the
scope of this Article, I share many of these concerns. Yet despite seemingly
limitless expansion of these technologies and their overuse, DHS has continued
to insist to courts that detention shielded from due process scrutiny must persist
as a necessary part of its sovereign exclusion power. Courts have largely
accepted this contention, be it from risk aversion, inertia, or complacency. But
the reality of DHS’s spiraling surveillance—considering both the technologies’
actual use and their varying availability—has significant implications for the
present-day operation of entry fiction, as explored below.
VII. FICTION, FUNCTION, BORDER, AND TERRITORY
The border, of course, is a fiction: an imaginary line drawn upon a unitary
landmass to connote sovereign control over territory. Territory, too, is fiction:
a false constant atop shifting geological markers, as unstable as sedimentation
itself. The fiction of sovereignty, meanwhile, grounds liberal democracy: that
governing power emerges from the consent of the people, whether or not they
consent. 401 In the United States, courts have sourced the nature and scope of
that power from a largely silent Constitution. 402
Given these fictions enmeshed in fictions, scholars and social theorists
have long shown that border, territory, and sovereignty defy any fixed
configuration. 403 Entry fiction itself, of course, destabilizes fixed notions of

400. See Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 644–45
(2019); Michelle Alexander, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-reforms-race-technology.html
[https://perma.cc/PTV8-M88T (dark archive)]. But scholars have also argued that the properly limited
use of electronic monitoring should replace pretrial detention of individuals who cannot post bail. See
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 837, 894–95
(discussing electronic monitoring in lieu of detention to address flight risk); Samuel R. Wiseman,
Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1403 (2014) (arguing that courts
should adapt Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to enact a shift from pretrial detention to electronic
monitoring).
401. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 63 (2011)
(discussing the “compact-based approach” to domestic rights and noting its long pedigree in Western
political thought); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 921 (1991) (discussing
social contract tradition of Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, and John Locke, under which
“individual obligation to obey must be grounded in individual consent, either actual or justly
presumed”).
402. See supra Section III.A.
403. Professor Saskia Sassen, for example, traces how nation-states have been “deterritorialized”
in contemporary systems and the resulting logics, such as through global flows of capital and new
regional political systems. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 13–15 (2006). Anthropologists Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier propose using
“assemblage” as a conceptual tool for studying new global configurations, including the
deterrorialization and reterritorialization of nation-states in situated contexts. Stephen J. Collier &
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space, rendering physical presence on U.S. soil a “nullity,” as Professor Volpp
describes. 404 It in fact operationalizes “the border” within U.S. territory,
creating constitutional exception zones within U.S. detention centers—but its
continued maintenance of these spaces has avoided necessary scrutiny vis-à-vis
technological and carceral changes. Contemporary legal scholars note that
technological surveillance of immigrants enacts a fundamental qualitative shift
in the relationship between sovereignty, borders, and noncitizens. Professor
Kalhan identifies a “migration border . . . decoupled from the territorial border
and rendered ‘virtual.’” 405 Professor Ayelet Shachar similarly unpacks a
“shifting border,” in which the where and how of immigration enforcement
“depart[s] radically from the territorial-centered conception of the static border,
carved under the Westphalian image,” including via new technological
initiatives. 406 As explained below, the constitutional borderline has recently
shifted outward as well—to nonsovereign territory—under the Supreme
Court’s more recent Suspension Clause jurisprudence. 407
Yet, entry fiction continues unabated despite stark changes in immigration
capacities and practices as well as the evolution of constitutional case law. First
articulated by the Court in the Chinese Exclusion era and further extended
during the early Cold War, entry fiction operates today in a context likely
unimaginable to the jurists of both eras. Given the definitional hallmarks of
legal fiction, this blindness to context—to contemporary versus historical
realities—is inexcusable. Below, I examine entry fiction in relation to legal
fictions’ defining attributes of function, equity, and danger, as distilled from my
discussion of Professor Fuller’s, Blackstone’s, and Bentham’s works. 408 As I
show below, each of these attributes favors entry fiction’s expiration. 409 I also
evaluate counterarguments for entry fiction’s survival.
A.

Function

Entry fiction is tied to the sovereign power to exclude: the power to
determine who comes in and who stays out, which the Court deems “inherent
Aibwa Ong, Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems, in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 14–15 (Aibwa Ong
& Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005).
404. Volpp, supra note 34, at 457.
405. Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, supra note 327, at 9.
406. Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 165, 189
(2007). Professor Shachar documents both an inward shift, via new regimes and practices (like
expedited removal and immigration enforcement by local authorities), as well an outward shift beyond
U.S. territory via preclearance screening technology in foreign airports and bilateral agreements. Id. at
175, 192. My thanks to Professor Chimène Keitner for insightful discussions around Professor Shachar’s
work.
407. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see infra Section VII.A (discussing recent case law).
408. See supra Part II.
409. I omit analysis of falsity, as the fictional nonpresence of persons in U.S. territory detention
remains untrue from the time of entry fiction’s emergence to the present day.
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in sovereignty” and “essential to self-preservation.” 410 The government broadly
asserts—and the Court has thus far agreed—that detention enables this
authority, rendering it part and parcel of entry fiction. 411 Detention serves the
need, they say, to control our borders and protect our territory; entry fiction
protects the government’s power to detain. But, in fact, both contemporary
technology and recent case law extending habeas rights to Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba—through a territorial fiction, no less—reveal that any such need has
expired.
Previously, detention may have served as a useful proxy for refusing
physical entry into territory, ensuring that individuals denied formal admission
did not simply disappear into the interior and thus stymie removal. Certainly,
in the era of Chinese Exclusion, there was no reliable substitute. It is hard to
imagine Mr. Blake, the immigration inspector in the 1880s, 412 having any
practical or technological means to easily locate individuals released from
detention and intent on absconding. Even authorities seeking to keep tabs on
Mr. Mezei in 1953 would have had to expend significant resources to
continually ensure his whereabouts if released. True, he might have been subject
to house arrest or instructed not to leave the jurisdiction. But as described, it
would have taken personnel-intensive monitoring to enforce constant
compliance with those terms.
Today, ICE has a number of tools at its disposal that effectively ensures
removal of individuals who lose their immigration cases, even without locking
them away. Described above, 413 these tracking technologies enable ICE to keep
close, real-time watch on individuals’ whereabouts even after release from
detention. Programs employing these technological alternatives, moreover,
have proven effective in ensuring that individuals show up to their court
hearings—and have saved hundreds of millions of dollars from leaving public
coffers.
Although GPS tracking technologies raise serious First and Fourth
Amendment concerns, 414 ICE already uses them for tens of thousands of
immigrants released from its custody. And even beyond direct tracking and
supervision mechanisms, DHS’s surveillance architecture grows ever pervasive.
Data mining and passive collection of identity markers render anonymity and
escape of known individuals unlikely. As described, ICE currently contracts for
analytics software that combines information from DMV locations, utility
companies, phone companies, credit bureaus, and other sources. It has mined
DMV database photos for facial recognition. And it has spent tens of millions
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
See Wong Wing v. United States 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896); supra Sections IV.B, V.B.
See supra Section VI.A.
See supra Section VI.B.
See supra notes 392–400 and accompanying text.

99 N.C. L. REV. 565 (2021)

2021]

THE END OF ENTRY FICTION

631

of dollars to install license plate readers all over the country. As DHS’s reach
into the interior and everyday lives and transactions of individuals grows, the
likelihood of individuals in its system “disappearing” grows dim.
In failing to account for the actual tools of sovereign exclusion—which,
unlike earlier eras, are no longer tied to the physical sequestration of persons—
entry fiction is now untenably unmoored from its asserted sovereign function.
This inside-territory constitutional exception is especially jarring given the
Court’s functional turn on sovereignty and outside territory. In Boumediene v.
Bush, 415 the Court in 2008 recognized the constitutional right of habeas corpus
for individuals detained in Guantanamo Bay, eschewing a bright-line territorial
rule and softening more rigid interpretations of its earlier decisions in the
Insular Cases. 416 Although the Court agreed there was no question “that Cuba,
not the United States, maintains sovereignty,” 417 it deemed functional control
over territory sufficient (with other factors) to extend the right of habeas
corpus. 418 The Court distinguished its Mezei-era decision in Johnson v.
Eisentrager 419—which refused habeas corpus to enemy combatants in Landsberg,
415. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
416. The Insular Cases arose during the turn of the twentieth century, following the United States’
acquisition of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, as well as the
United States’ annexation of Hawaii. The Court deemed the U.S. Constitution to apply in full to
incorporated territories, but only in part to unincorporated territories. Id. at 756–57 (listing the Insular
Cases as De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904)). Boumediene adopted a
functional view of these cases as well, hinging their outcomes not on a bright-line territorial rule, but
rather on the practical difficulties of transforming the civil law system of the former Spanish colonies
into an Anglo-American system. Id. at 757; Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution?
Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 984 (2009) (concluding “the Boumediene
Court got it right” in rejecting the standard view of the Insular Cases as limiting the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution to only its most fundamental rights). Notably, scholars and jurists have
criticized and/or noted the inherent limitations of Boumediene’s functional test. See id. at 978 (arguing
that such concerns should not guide the applicability of constitutional guarantees, but rather how to
enforce guarantees that do apply); Keitner, supra note 401, at 79 (discussing lower court cases that
“illustrate[] the subjectivity involved in applying the ‘practical obstacles’ test”); Jules Lobel, Separation
of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1669 (2013)
(“Boumediene’s functional test focuses too narrowly on practical factors . . . [and, in so doing,] ignores
the substantive-due process/fundamental-norms jurisprudence articulated in the precedents on which
the decision relies.”); see also Keitner, supra note 401, at 73–75 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–
75, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (discussing the dispute between Justices Black and Harlan over
the “impracticable and anomalous” test employed in Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1 (1957), which was later
adopted in Boumediene).
417. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754.
418. Id. at 771. The Court identified “at least three factors” as relevant to the Suspension Clause’s
reach: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which
that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”
Id. at 766.
419. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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Germany, during the Allied occupation, emphasizing the “practical barriers” 420
and “practical obstacles” 421 of that earlier time. But the practicalities that
prevented habeas rights from extending to Landsberg Prison are not present in
today’s Guantanamo Bay facility. As a result, the Court held that the
Constitution could, and thus must, functionally extend habeas rights to
Guantanamo detainees. 422
The Supreme Court in Thuraissigiam declined to read Boumediene broadly
to extend greater habeas protections to immigrants subject (in its view) to entry
fiction with regard to governmental admissions decisions. 423 The Court did so
despite the obvious tension between extending habeas rights to individuals
detained at Guantanamo Bay based on practicability and ignoring the selfevident practicability of greater habeas rights for individuals in ICE detention.
But Thuraissigiam was emphatically rooted in the Court’s view of robust habeas
protections in the detention context, drawing a stark and explicit contrast
between detention and admissions decisions. Relying on the respondent’s
agreement that the Court could base its decision on the scope of the Suspension
Clause in 1789, the Court’s analysis of habeas rights centered on understandings
at that time. 424 After conducting an extensive historical analysis, it concluded
that Mr. Thuraissigiam’s claim failed precisely because the record lacked any
evidence that “the writ of habeas corpus was understood at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution to permit a petitioner to claim the right to enter
420. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 763.
421. Id. at 766.
422. Id. at 769–71.
423. The Supreme Court’s decision resolved a former circuit split on whether applicants for
admission (including but not limited to unentered individuals) have constitutional habeas rights with
regard to issuance of a removal order. In Castro v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 835
F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit ruled that the immigration statutes stripped the courts of
their ability to review expedited removal orders except in extremely limited circumstances—and that
the statutes did not violate the Suspension Clause as applied to asylum seeker families in expedited
removal. Id. at 450; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e). Its conclusion that petitioners could not invoke the
Suspension Clause hinged largely on the Supreme Court’s entry fiction and plenary power due process
cases. Castro, 835 F.3d at 446–48. The Ninth Circuit recently agreed with the Third Circuit’s statutory
interpretation but reached the opposite conclusion on the constitutional issue. Thuraissigiam v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1116–19 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). It held
that the jurisdiction-stripping statutes did violate the Suspension Clause as applied to an asylum seeker
in expedited removal. Id. at 1119. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Third Circuit’s reliance on due
process case law to determine the reach of the Suspension Clause, but it expressly declined to address
“what right or rights Thuraissigiam may vindicate via use of the writ.” Id. at 1119 (first citing
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798; then citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001)); see also id. at
1115 (discussing the Supreme Court’s “finality era” decisions on the writ in the immigration context).
Although in my view the Ninth Circuit’s decision offers greater analytical precision on the reach of the
Suspension Clause, the Supreme Court of course validated the Third Circuit’s conclusion.
424. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969 (2020) (“[T]he Clause, at a
minimum, ‘protects the writ as it existed in 1789’ . . . . And in this case, respondent agrees that ‘there
is no reason’ to consider whether the Clause extends any further. We therefore proceed on that basis.”
(citation omitted)).
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or remain in the country”; rather “[t]he writ simply provided a means of
contesting the lawfulness of restraint and securing release.” 425 Although
Thuraissigiam adopts an expansive view of entry fiction for admissions decisions,
and limits immigrants’ constitutional habeas and due process rights in that
context, it also provides support for more robust and searching constitutional
protections against detention.
The truth of Guantanamo’s existence outside the United States does not
preclude constitutional habeas protections for enemy combatants abroad, where
practicality permits. Yet, a fiction that denies immigrants’ presence in detention
centers within our borders jarringly continues to stymie constitutional due
process rights, absent any practical barriers whatsoever. Although habeas and
due process rights are not coextensive, 426 the contrast nevertheless highlights
that entry fiction’s blindness to function is untenable.
B.

Danger

The danger inherent in entry fiction is fully realized today: its function
has expired, and it furthers inequity. Moreover, the danger and harm that
Professor Fuller and others warned of, and that Bentham railed against, have
come to pass 427: the government and Court seem to have forgotten the original
justifications of entry fiction, allowing it to mutate into a fiction for its own
sake.
There is an additional danger lurking, too, in impermissible—and
untenably shielded—uses of civil immigration detention authority. As
mentioned, the Court in Wong Wing early declared arrest and detention
permissible “in order to make effectual” exclusion or expulsion. 428 But it struck
down as unconstitutional statutory provisions imposing hard labor, which did
not similarly facilitate removal and therefore amounted to punishment

425. Id. at 1969 (emphasis added).
426. The right to due process and the right to habeas corpus are often interconnected but not
coextensive. As many scholars have noted, their precise relationship remains ambiguous. See, e.g., David
Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal
Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2503 (1998) (“This is not to say that the Suspension Clause and the Due
Process Clause are redundant. . . . The two principles work in tandem to require judicial review of the
legality of all executive detentions.”); Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due
Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV.
1361, 1364 (2010) (“[T]he relationship between the Suspension and Due Process Clauses remains
completely unsettled.”); Mary Van Houten, Note, The Post-Boumediene Paradox: Habeas Corpus or Due
Process?, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 10–11 (2014) (remarking that the Court has left “the content of
the writ and the contours of the habeas-due process relationship undefined”). It is well settled that
unentered individuals in immigration detention can challenge their detention via habeas corpus. See
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839–41 (2018).
427. See supra Part II (discussing Fuller and Bentham’s views on legal fictions); see also Soifer, supra
note 78, at 877 (observing that legal fictions may dangerously bend and control legal thought).
428. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
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requiring a jury trial. Reading with and against Wong Wing, scholars trace
myriad ways that immigration detention has now crossed into punishment.
These include the severity of conditions and restrictions on liberty, 429 the
expanding nexus between criminal and immigration processes, 430 the design and
experience of immigration detention centers, 431 and the punitive design of
detention laws by Congress. 432
Under policies of the outgoing Trump Administration, the aims of
detention and removal grew more punitive by executive design as well.
President Trump described individuals in migrant caravans as an “invasion” 433
and immigrants from Mexico as “bad ‘hombres.’” 434 In a January 2017 executive
order titled “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” he
directed the creation of ICE’s Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement
Office (“VOICE”). 435 VOICE explicitly blurred the lines between civil and
criminal enforcement, explaining its “singular, straightforward mission” as
“ensur[ing] victims and their families have access to releasable information
429. See, e.g., Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, supra note 262, at 50; Mark Noferi, Making
Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 27 J. C.R.
& ECON. DEV. 533, 552–56 (2014) (documenting similarities between civil immigration detention and
criminal incarceration in the United States); see also DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2–3 (2009) (“ICE relies
primarily on correctional incarceration standards designed for pre-trial felons and on correctional
principles of care, custody, and control.”).
430. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376–78 (2006) (exploring the convergence of criminal and immigration law).
Individuals also of course experience both detention and deportation as punishment. See, e.g., Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1929 (2000) (“[T]he fiction that deportation is not punishment is
especially hard to maintain when a person is incarcerated for a long period of time as part of the
process.”).
431. See Simon, supra note 253, at 587 (describing “physical design of Krome” detention center in
the early 1990s and its disciplinary practices as becoming punitive).
432. García Hernández, supra note 254, at 1349. Professor García Hernández locates the punitive
nature of immigration detention in legislative intent, tracing the launching of our current system of
immigration detention in the 1980s and 1990s along with the War on Drugs as a result of design rather
than coincidence. Id. He concludes the intertwinement of immigration detention with penal
incarceration amounts to a “legal architecture that, in contrast with the prevailing legal characterization,
is formally punitive.” Id.
433. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 29, 2018, 10:41 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1056919064906469376 [https://perma.cc/HM93-9H7J]
(“Many Gang Members and some very bad people are mixed into the Caravan heading to our Southern
Border. Please go back, you will not be admitted into the United States unless you go through the legal
process. This is an invasion of our Country and our Military is waiting for you!”).
434. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 17, 2019, 6:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1129336982319050752 [https://perma.cc/KN4T-MJ7Y]
(“Border Patrol is apprehending record numbers of people at the Southern Border. The bad ‘hombres,’
of which there are many, are being detained & will be sent home. Those which we release under the
ridiculous Catch & Telease [sic] loophole, are being registered and will be removed later!”).
435. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (originally referring to office
as the Office for Victims of Crimes Committed by Removable Aliens).
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about a perpetrator and to offer assistance explaining the immigration removal
process.” 436 It also oversaw a national “Victim Information and Notification
Exchange” system that automatically notifies victims and witnesses “about
changes to custody status” of “criminal aliens charged or convicted of a crime,”
pulling immigrant “detainee location data” from ICE’s systems. 437 Yet
immigrants who commit crimes end up in ICE detention only after serving out
whatever criminal sentence (or portion thereof) the state deems as adequate
punishment or rehabilitation. To cast immigration detention as additional
retribution against “perpetrators” further erases its civil nature.
In the same January 2017 executive order, President Trump essentially
eliminated prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases. 438 Whereas President
Obama previously directed ICE officers to use prosecutorial discretion in
detention and removal decisions, focusing resources on priority removals and
considering equities such as family and community ties, 439 President Trump’s
ICE acting director described President Trump as “taking the handcuffs off”
his officers. 440 With immigration actions veering closer to punitive intent from
the highest levels, combined with virtually unrestricted enforcement authority
by lower officials, the constitutional vacuum created by entry fiction grows
more concerning.
The new Biden Administration has already rescinded the January 2017
executive order in a new executive order titled “Revision of Civil Immigration
Enforcement Policies and Priorities.” 441 This order appeared among several
immigration-related executive orders and proclamations undoing the Trump
Administration’s immigration policies that President Biden signed on his first
day in office. 442 Notwithstanding the large shift in approach to immigration by
the Biden Administration, the fundamentally punitive nature of immigration
detention persists. Its design, character, and experience as punishment both
436. Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE) Office, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
https://www.ice.gov/voice [https://perma.cc/QF45-QSYY].
437. Id.
438. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also Memorandum Regarding
Enforcement of the Immigration Laws To Serve the National Interest from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leadership of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-ImmigrationLaws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/25VQ-QEPN].
439. Memorandum Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to All ICE Employees (June 30, 2010), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civilenforcement-priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU3U-DLDE].
440. Franklin Foer, How Trump Radicalized ICE, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772/ [https://perma.cc/658JWZEG (dark archive)].
441. Exec. Order No. 13,993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 20, 2021).
442. See Briefing Room: Presidential Actions, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/ [https://perma.cc/Y49A-ZVV4].
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predate and continue beyond the outgoing Trump Administration. 443
Moreover, even with the likely lesser use of detention (and potential steps
toward deprivatization) by the current Biden Administration, failing to afford
detained individuals more robust constitutional due process rights would leave
them vulnerable to changes in policy under a different administration, or
changes in law by a different Congress. 444
C.

Counterarguments

The government may likely continue to defend entry fiction, and judges
will of course consider downsides to its elimination. Below I evaluate and
respond to existing and likely future arguments in its defense.
1. Dangerous Individuals or Immigration Absconders on Our Streets
Judges may be reluctant to eliminate entry fiction should they perceive it
as all that prevents a flood of dangerous individuals or absconders on our streets.
The government has often invoked security risks and threats in defending entry
fiction. 445 Fortunately, this scenario would not come to pass in entry fiction’s
absence.
A modicum of due process rights against detention for nonentrants would
neither bind the hands of government officials nor result in mass release of
individuals who pose a serious risk of danger or flight. Indeed, courts need not
fear that due process rights conferred to nonentrants would result in the
immediate release of any particular individuals. Rather, DHS would continue
to have authority to detain such individuals—it simply would have to articulate
a permissible civil purpose to do so and demonstrate this need at a procedurally
adequate hearing. Considering the procedural due process factors under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 446 the form of hearing would likely be a bond hearing
before an immigration judge. 447
443. See supra notes 441–44 and accompanying text.
444. Notably, although President Biden sent a proposed immigration bill, the U.S. Citizenship
Act of 2021, to Congress on January 20, 2021, the White House’s official fact sheet of the bill
makes no mention of detention provision changes. Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to
Congress as Part of His Commitment To Modernize Our Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/factsheet-president-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernizeour-immigration-system/ [https://perma.cc/LD92-XL7H]. The actual text of the bill, which has yet to
be introduced in either chamber of Congress, is not publicly available as of the date this Article went
to press. A new executive order directs the Department of Justice not to renew contracts with private
prison companies for criminal detention facilities but contains no such direction for immigration
detention. Exec. Order No. 14,006, 86 Fed. Reg. 7483 (Jan. 29, 2021).
445. See, e.g., supra note 245 and accompanying text.
446. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
447. The Court described the balancing test for assessing adequacy of process for procedural due
process as follows:
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Notably, this is precisely the scheme we have under the general
immigration detention statute, 448 which broadly authorizes discretionary
detention for immigrants in removal proceedings. 449 As mentioned, these
individuals already get the benefit of a bond hearing before an immigration
judge. Within these constraints, the government can—and does—still detain
hundreds of thousands of these immigrants each year, as immigration judges
often side with the government’s views. According to the Transaction Records
Access Clearing House, only between eighteen percent and thirty percent of
immigrants in the past few years were released on bond after a bond hearing
before an immigration judge. 450 The basic procedural check of a bond hearing,
and the requirement that the government provide some substantive rationale
for detention, simply places some reasonable and minimal protections on
deprivations of liberty. It still fully—indeed, too easily—allows the government
to detain individuals who pose a risk of danger or flight.
2. Managing the Border
President Trump relentlessly asserted a need to close down the U.S.Mexico border, declaring a national emergency for wall funding and announcing
on Twitter: “Our Country is FULL!” 451 Entry fiction does, to an extent, make
detention of some asylum seekers at our southern border easier, allowing ICE
to flout its own policies and deny individuals release more easily. But entry
fiction only applies to a smaller subset of asylum seekers in our system: those

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335; see also Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 387 F. Supp. 3d. 1219, 1230 (W.D. Wash.
2019) (applying Mathews factors and concluding “[t]he ‘value of the procedural safeguard’ of a bond
hearing is self-evident” (citation omitted)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 953 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2020),
vacated, No. 20-234, 2021 WL 78039 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2021) (mem.). The Ninth Circuit upheld the
portion of a district court’s injunction ordering bond hearings before immigration judges for asylum
seekers who effected an entry. See Padilla v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 953 F.3d 1134, 1142–43 (9th
Cir. 2020), vacated, No. 20-234, 2021 WL 78039 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2021) (mem.); see also supra notes 210–
11 (describing the development of due process rights of entered asylum seekers as demonstrated in
Padilla, 953 F.3d 1134).
448. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
449. Id.
450. Three-Fold Difference in Immigration Bond Amounts by Court Location, TRAC IMMIGR. (July 2,
2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/519/ [https://perma.cc/Y792-ZC5N] (“So far [in
2018], [the] success rate has been 30.5 percent, up from 18.4 percent during FY 2014.”).
451. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 7, 2019, 9:03 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1115057524770844672 [https://perma.cc/BS8P-XJ7W].
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who orderly present at a port of entry. Greater numbers are apprehended after
crossing the border and thus are not subject to entry fiction. 452
The government has significant control over persons who arrive at or near
its border ports of entry. DHS has returned tens of thousands of asylum seekers
processed at the southern border to wait in Mexico while their U.S. immigration
court cases are pending. 453 It does so despite the significant risk of violence that
migrants face in Mexico. 454 The individuals subject to these so-called “Migrant
Protection Protocols” are both entered and arriving, and mostly from Central
America.
Even apart from these postprocessing returns, DHS has engaged in
“metering” to slow down or refuse initial processing of asylum seekers at U.S.
ports of entry. It has placed tens of thousands of individuals on a waitlist, where
people remain for weeks or even months. 455 This metering has forced many
asylum seekers who face danger or instability in Mexico to cross the border
illegally to seek U.S. asylum (after which they are often, per the above, returned
to Mexico). And in spring 2020, the Trump Administration took the
extraordinary step of prohibiting entry of all individuals arriving at land ports
of entry or near land borders other than excepted groups (such as lawful
permanent residents, citizens, and limited others)—invoking public health laws
and the COVID-19 pandemic. 456
To the extent that entry fiction makes detention of arriving individuals
easier, this does not provide a border management rationale under current DHS
policy. The majority of arriving individuals in ICE detention are asylum seekers
452. See Claims of Fear, supra note 21 (showing 38,269 arriving asylum seekers and 54,690
“apprehended,” or in other words, entered, asylum seekers in FY 2018).
453. See Memorandum Regarding Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection
Protocols from Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to L. Francis Cissna, Kevin
McAleenan & Ronald Vitiello (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SQD-SW6G];
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C); Jason Kao & Denise Lu, How Trump’s Policies Are Leaving Thousands
of Asylum Seekers Waiting in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/08/18/us/mexico-immigration-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/9KV9-PAFG (dark
archive)] (reporting almost 32,000 individuals subject to return to Mexico under the policy as of August
2019). In fall 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case involving a challenge to the Migrant
Protection Protocols. Wolf v. Innovation L. Lab, 141 S. Ct. 617 (2020) (mem.).
454. See generally HUMAN RTS. WATCH, “WE CAN’T HELP YOU HERE”: US RETURNS OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS TO MEXICO (July 2, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/07/02/we-cant-helpyou-here/us-returns-asylum-seekers-mexico [https://perma.cc/WX9N-RHLZ] (documenting the risks
of serious crimes asylum seekers face, including sexual assault and kidnapping).
455. See id.; Ava C. Benach, The Border How We Got Here, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2019, at 27, 29
(noting that between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals were waiting in Tijuana for a chance to apply for
asylum in the United States as of March 2019).
456. See Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons from Countries Where a
Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,061 (Mar. 20, 2020) (invoking authority under 42
U.S.C. §§ 265, 268 to suspend entry of individuals at land ports of entry and near the U.S.-Mexico
and U.S.-Canada borders).
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who warrant release under DHS’s own directives. 457 As explained, once asylum
seekers pass their initial asylum screening interviews, DHS policy instructs
officers to release them “in the public interest,” so long as they are not a flight
risk or danger, while they pursue their asylum claims in immigration
proceedings. 458
Finally, even if the government changes its parole policy, studies have
shown that the prospect of detention in the United States does not meaningfully
alter the migration decisions of individuals fleeing violence and persecution. 459
Moreover, at least one court has enjoined ICE from using detention against
asylum seekers in order to deter future migration, holding that deterrence
rationales are impermissible for civil detention. 460 In short, detention pursuant
to entry fiction does not permissibly, coherently, or practicably manage an
influx of asylum seekers at the border.
3. Exclusion Defeated by Allowing Individuals Out of Detention Pending
Proceedings
The government may also argue that detaining arriving individuals while
their court cases are pending serves the sovereign purposes of exclusion in a
more total sense—not just ultimate exclusion from the country but also interim
exclusion by preventing release into communities, even absent security or flight
risk. In Jennings, for example, the government argued that disruption of labor
markets was an additional reason for detention without a bond hearing for
arriving noncitizens. 461
As an initial matter, this position is extreme. Depriving broad populations
from liberty and community ties simply because the government deems them
categorically “unpresent” is morally suspect. When considering the harsh
conditions of immigration detention, it grows even more concerning.
Moreover, the Court has never deemed isolation of individuals in detention for
its own sake as a worthy or necessary goal of sovereign exclusion. To the
contrary, as explained above, entry fiction’s emergence in the Chinese
Exclusion era rested explicitly on the Court deeming immigrants’ release to city
mission homes preferable to their continued confinement on disease-ridden

457. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
458. DIRECTIVE 11002.1, supra note 277.
459. Jonathan T. Hiskey, Abby Córdova, Mary Fran Malone & Diana M. Orcés, Leaving the Devil
You Know: Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America, 53
LATIN AM. RES. REV. 429, 442 (2018) (finding that awareness of harsher U.S. enforcement practices
did not impact Central Americans’ migration intentions).
460. See R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding deterrence an
impermissible rationale for civil detention and enjoining the government’s policy of using immigration
detention to deter future asylum seekers).
461. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 275, at 23.
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ships. 462 As described and depicted above, mission homes were boardinghouses
integrated into dense urban neighborhoods, not jails set apart from society. 463
Even in Mezei, the Court emphasized throughout the Attorney General’s
finding that Mr. Mezei posed a national security risk. 464 Neither the
government nor the Court marked him as undesirable solely for being
unentered.
Nor has Congress provided any indication of adopting such a broad and
total vision of sovereign exclusion. To the contrary, it has specified—without
distinguishing between arriving and entered asylum seekers—that work
authorization “may be provided under regulation” 180 days after individuals file
an asylum application. 465 Congress would not have authorized arriving
individuals’ employment in the United States while their asylum cases were
pending had it wanted them completely sealed off from society during that
time. Congress also, of course, authorized arriving individuals’ release via
§ 1182(d)(5) parole. In short, entry fiction was never intended to ensure
immigrants’ categorical social isolation pending resolution of their cases.
4. The Dangers of Expanding Surveillance
As mentioned, DHS’s surveillance dragnet raises serious First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendment concerns. In describing this massive technological
system actually in place, I neither endorse these practices nor support their
expansion. My argument, rather, is that the very availability of these
technologies—putting aside their use—renders the entry fiction functionally
unnecessary to effectuate sovereign exclusion powers. This argument would
hold even with a significant and appropriate scale back of DHS’s current
surveillance dragnet. Even absent passive technologies and mass data collection,
the targeted and individualized use of GPS monitoring via ankle bracelets or
cell phone check-ins would serve as an adequate alternative to detention for
individuals who present a particular risk of flight. Those who do not present
such risks should simply be released.
Moreover, these technologies can and should be subject to greater
oversight and due process protections. Appropriate and limited use of
surveillance alternatives still favor the end of entry fiction—and entry fiction’s
demise should not, and need not, give rise to unnecessary or unrestricted
expansion of monitoring. But, at minimum, for as long as DHS continues in its
ongoing project of mass surveillance, entry fiction must assuredly expire.

462. See supra Section III.C (discussing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)).
463. See supra notes 133–41 and accompanying text (describing services and environment of
mission houses).
464. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208, 213–14, 216 (1953).
465. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2).
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CONCLUSION
“[T]his maxim is ever invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to work
an injury.”
—William Blackstone, Commentaries 466
As a legal fiction, entry fiction should serve some equitable end, driven by
a functional necessity that justifies a subversion of reality. Entry fiction today
furthers neither equity nor functionality in law or practice. Rather, DHS now
operates a mass detention system that imposes human suffering on an enormous
scale. It does so, moreover, while deploying unprecedented surveillance
technologies throughout the United States that render mass, indiscriminate,
unchecked use of detention authority unnecessary.
Entry fiction did once encapsulate the hallmarks of legal fiction. In the
late nineteenth century, entry fiction served as useful “scaffolding” for law—a
way for courts to grapple with the new legal problem of immigration
enforcement. The exclusion laws were only a few years old, the immigration
bureau was tiny, and the “how” of effectuating exclusion was in tension with
the desire to spare immigrants from dangerous conditions onboard their ships.
Under Mezei, the beneficial purposes of the scaffolding were less clear—but the
Court nevertheless insisted that the impetus for entry fiction was a humane one,
intended to avoid unnecessary hardship.
In recent doctrinal shifts, the Court appears to have simply forgotten entry
fiction’s equitable ends. Previously, in the Chinese Exclusion era through the
Cold War era, the Court reiterated rationales for entry fiction rooted in humane
treatment of immigrants, for example, allowing disembarkation from pestilent
ships, or incentivizing the minimal use of detention. But today the Court simply
ignores this explicit aspect of its jurisprudence and allows entry fiction to
devolve into a constitutional absence for its own sake.
The Court also ignores vital differences in context, essential to the
continuing assessment of legal fictions. The dissimilarities between an early
twentieth-century religious boardinghouse and present-day ICE jails fail to
register in the Court’s contemporary decisions. So, too, do the sea changes in
immigration enforcement technologies from the 1880s, to the 1950s, to the
present.
The sovereign power to exclude today does not require detention to take
place outside normal constitutional scrutiny. As ICE’s surveillance of
immigrants grows ever pervasive, the need for detention to effectuate sovereign
exclusion disappears—and with it, the need for a fiction that shields detention
from due process. And far from minimizing the suffering of immigrants, entry
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fiction today ensnares them in the black box of an increasingly pervasive and
oppressive carceral regime.
This blindness to history and context, equity and function, fiction and
rationale cannot stand. Legal fictions are mortal, carrying within them the seeds
of their own demise. When a fiction ceases to serve its functions and advances
inhumanity rather than equity, the scaffolding must come down, and the
doctrine must expire. For entry fiction, that time is now.

